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COPYRIGHTS: CONCURRENCE, REVISION, AND
PHOTOCOPYING-WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY
v. UNITED STATES, A "HOLDING OPERATION" BY
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS*
Editors' Note: Prior to publication of this comment, the
judgement of the United States Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins Company was affirmed per curiam by
an equally divided United States Supreme Court. Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W.
4314 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1975).
Since the founding of the United States, the unanimous legislative' and overwhelming judicial 2 consensus has been that states
* A portion of this Comment won First Prize in the Nathan Burkan
Memorial Copyright Paper Competition held at the Dickinson School of
Law in 1974.
1. The present federal copyright law is contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1216 (1962). The present federal law expressly reserves the common law
right to protect an author's literary property via 17 U.S.C. § 2 which provides that:
§ 2 RIGHTS OF AN AUTHOR OR PROPRIETER OF UNPUBLISHED WORK.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the
right of the author or proprieter of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use
of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.
The purpose of the section was stated as follows: "It was thought best by
the committee to insert the provision [17 U.S.C. § 2] in this form in order
that it might be perfectly clear that nothing in the bill was intended to impair in any way the common law rights with respect to this kind of
[unpublished] work." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) reprinted in A. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 194, 196 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as HOWELL]. For the meaning and significance of the term "publication," see notes 173-74 and accompanying text infra.
2. The common law property of an author is not taken away by
the Constitution of the United States. The States have not surrendered to the Union their whole power over copyrights, but retain
a power concurrent with the power of Congress so far that an
author may enjoy his common law property, and be entitled to
common law remedies, independently of the acts of Congress.
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 597-98 (1834). "[N]o American
court ever actually held that our copyright statute forbids the protection
of published works at common law." J.F. WHicHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 91 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as WHICHER, CREATIVE ARTS]; Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 214-15 (1954); Fox Film Co. v. Doyal, 296 U.S. 123, 127-28
(1932); Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Shane, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d
886 (1964). But see, note 47 infra, for cases containing dictum to the contrary.
3. A state may protect an author's literary property by statute or under the common law principles that the state has developed. There exist
no uniformity in state statutes or the states' common law principles for protecting literary property. See, S. ROTHEN ERG, LEGAL PROTECTION OF LITERATU E, ART AND Music 2-3 (1960)
[hereinafter referred to as ROTHENBERO];
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 44 (1972) [hereinafter referred to
as NIMmER].
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and federal 4 laws for protecting literary property could operate concurrently in our dual copyright law system. 5 This dual system
allows the states to protect, either by statute or applicable common
law principles6 (sometimes referred to as "common law copyright"),
all literary works which have not been published. After "publication"'7 occurs, however, literary works which come within the federal law classifications of copyrightable subject matter can only
be protected by federal copyright law.
In recent years, judicial interpretations of the constitution 9 and
rapid increases in technology have cast doubts upon the continuance
of this system. However, the most recent judicial construction of
the constitutional foundation of American copyright law, the
"Copyright Clause,"'1 sustains and clarifies the present dual system.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1962).

For infringement of "literary prop-

erty rights" litigation is pursued in a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1962)

provides that "[tJhe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights
and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the states in patents and copyright cases." For infringement of a "copyright" civil litigation
is pursued under 28 U.S.C. § 1400 which provides that "[c]ivil actions, suits,
or proceedings arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights may
be instituted in the district court in which the defendant or his agent resides
or may be found." 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (a).
5. The terms "copyright," "literary property," and "intellectual property" are sometimes used interchangeably, however, they are not synonymous. The term "copyright" is used to describe:
an exclusive property right granted by statute to an author of an
intellectual production, for a limited term of years. [I]t is authoratively settled in the United States that there is no copyright except

that which is both created and secured by act of Congress; while
literary prorerty may exist independently of any statute.

H. BALL, THE LAW OF
[hereinafter referred to

COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 44-45 (1944)
as BALL].
The term "literary property" connotes

"the exclusive right that the creator of a literary work-a book, a story,
an article-has to own, use and dispose of what he has created." 1 A.
LINDEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS, viii (1963)
[ereinafter
referred to as LINDEY]. The term "literary property" is broader in scope
than, and may include the term "copyright." The term "intellectual property" is broader than and includes the rights encompassed by both the preceding terms as well as rights granted by a "patent." All the terms denote
intangible personal property, however, "intellectual property is broader; it
comprehends literary property and all the other products of the mind;
plays, motion pictures, radio and television scripts, songs, paintings, photographs, and so on." LINDEY,at 3.
6. Common law protection includes protection by principles and doctrines such as, common law "right of privacy," "trade name and trade secrets doctrines," "misappropriation," "passing off" and "palming off" principles and "fraud." See note 169 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 173-74 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 16, 19 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 49-58 and accompanying text infra.
10. "The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the Progress of

Notwithstanding this judicial construction, all indications" show
that the future intent of Congress is to establish a single uniform
federal system of copyright protection.' 2 The primary reason behind the intention of Congress to abolish the present system is the
devastating effect that technology has had upon the dual system."
As has been the case once before, 1 4 rapid advancements in technology have had a most profound effect upon the adequacy of our
copright laws." Present technology has produced such new forms
of communication as to torture the original meaning of the venerable terms of copyright law such as "writings,"'16 "publication,"'
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is the only constitutional provision pertaining
to intellectual property, and is also referred to as the "Patent Clause" or
the "Patent-Copyright Clause." The objective of this clause has been stated
as follows:
The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides
that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks
fit .... The policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great
body of the people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention
to give some bonus to authors and inventors.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), reprinted in HOWELL, supra
note 1, at 200.
11. See notes 159-160 and accompanying text infra.
12. Id.
13. Just as the first copyright laws were a restonse to an earlier
revolution brought on by the development of the printing press, so
must a copyright statute today respond to the challenge of a technology based on instant communication and reproduction of an author's works throughout the world.
J. MARKE, COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 88 (1967)
[hereinafter
referred to as MARKE].
14. The pressing need for a revision of the former copyright laws was
urged by President Theodore Roosevelt in his message to Congress in December, 1905. He stated:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect

in definition, confused and inconsistent in exoression; they omit
provision for many articles which, under modern revroductive processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon the
copyright proprieter which are not essential to the fair protection
of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for the copyright office to administer with satisfaction to
the public.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1909) reprinted in HOWELL, supra
note 1, at 194. The situation outlined by President Roosevelt, is just as true
today. Modern copying processes have again outstripped the copyright
laws as presently enacted.
15. "I am confronted daily with what are being called the 'information
explosion' and the 'communications explosion . . . These revolutionary
developments carry with them a profound challenge to creative endeavor,
and . . . our antiquated copyright law must be revised to meet this challenge." Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, Before A
Subcommittee on the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
ser. 8, at 28 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings, H.R. 4347 (1965)]
(statement of Hon. I. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress).
16. A necessary prerequisite for federal copyright protection is the requirement that the literary property be capable of classification under one
of the enumerated categories of "writings" set out in the copyright statute.
17 U.S.C. § 4 (1962) provides that "the works for which copyright may be
secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author." The
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and "copying."18 From the initial conception of some visible substance placed upon parchment, the term "writings" has been
stretched to include visible and invisible patterns of electro-magnetic radiation impressed upon cellulosic, polymetric and other
substrata.19 Originally limited by the range of the human voice
or the prevailing means of transporting physical objects, 20 the much
"bedeviled" term "publication," now encompasses acts that make
possible the dissemination of an author's works to millions of people
instantaneously. 21 The term "copying," historically applicable to
acceptable "writings" are set out in 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1962) which provides that
"the application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes
the work . . . belongs: .... ." "In general 'writings' include all tangible
expressions of intellectual creation . . . in some material form, capable of
identification and having a more or less permanent endurance." Comment,
Constitutional Limitations Upon The Congressional Power to Enact Copyright Legislation, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 534, 539 (1972). See, NIMMER, supra
note 3, at §§ 3, 8.1, 8.3, 8.31, 8.32; B. Rmos & P. GrrLaN, CoPYRIcHTs 1, 814 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as RINGER & GITLIN]; ROTHENBERG, supra
note 3, at 16-17, 20; BALL, supra note 5, at 65-66; Note, The Meaning of
"Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1263 (1956).
17. For the definition and meaning of the term "publication," see notes
173-174 and accompanying text infra.
18. A copyright gives the owner and exclusive right to "print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1962).
In White-Smith Music Co. v. Appollo Co, 209 U.S. 1 (1908), the Court held
that piano rolls were not "copies" of the plaintiff's sheet music because the
piano rolls were not duplicates of the sheet music but were deemed to be
a part of the machine. To be a copy, the Court required it to be a "'written or printed record . . . in an intelligible notation.'" See Project, New
Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and Computers,
15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 931, 1005-06 (1968) (hereinafter referred to as Project].
19. "[W]ritings . . . include all forms of writing, printing, engraving,
etching, etc. by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarong, 100 U.S. 82, 94
(1879). The copyright law has been extended in the past to cover such
items as musical compositions, works of art, photographs, and motion pictures. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1962).
However, sound recordings, until recently,
were not classified as copyrightable subject matter. Magnetic tapes containing computer programs are not classified. Other technological marvels,
such as accoustical and optical holographs (three dimensional pictures produced by pure acoustical sound waves and helium-laser devices respectively) are not covered by the present copyright law. See 1 LINDEY, supra
note 5, at xci-xcii (Supp. 1973).
20. See de Freitas, The Task of Author's Societies Vis-A-Vis New
Techniques of Communication and Exploitation of Intellectual Works, 20
BULL CR. Soc. 145 (1973).
21. Modern electronic communications devices have eliminated the
need for copies to be distributed physically in order to publish the author's
work. Satellite communications have made possible the dissemination of
an author's work on a worldwide basis. See generally de Freitas, The Task
of Author's Societies Vis-A-Vis Techniques of Communication and Exploitation of Intellectual Works, 20 BULL. CR. SOC. 145 (1973); Dugmore, The New-

reproduction by hand or mechanical printing machines, now applies
to the fast and inexpensive electrostatic photocopying process that
may soon allow the photocopying of an entire book at a price less
than the published price. 2 Technology has not only affected the
terms of copyright law, but has enabled an author to create works
presently enumerthat defy attempts at classification 23 under the
24
ated categories of copyrightable subject matter.
Congress has recognized the obsolescent effects that technology
has had upon our present 25 copyright laws. In response, it has
drafted an omnibus copyright law revision 26 which would afford
some measure of protection to those areas in which present protection of works produced by technological innovations is either nebulous or non-existent. This legislation would also provide a means
for supplying Congress with information of the continuing effects
of technology upon copyright law 27 so that it could take whatever
measures necessary to update the law. At present, efforts at
passing a revision bill continue to be thwarted by the interests of
diverse groups on the issues of photocopying and "fair use. ' 28 Both
of these issues are the central concern of the landmark case of
Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States, 29 which has received
vastly different treatment by the trial Commissioner appointed to
est Frontierin Communications: The Direct Broadcast Satellite, 13 AF JAG
L. REv. 259 (1971); Meyer, TV Carsettes: A New Frontier for Pioneers and
Pirates, 19 BULL. CR. Soc, 16 (1971); Wallace, Impact of New Technology
on International Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 18 BULL. CR. Soc. 293
(1971); Comment, Cybera: The Age of Information, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYM.
See also Doyle, Communications Satellites, 55
(ASCAP) 117 (1971).
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 446 (1967); Gotlieb, Recent Developments in the Law
of Space Communications, 20 UNIv. ToRONTo L.J. 359 (1970) and Throop,
Some Legal Factors of Satellite Communications, 17 AM. U.L. REV. 12
(1967).
22. See Note, Copyright Law and Library Photocopying: Striking a
Balance Between Profit Incentive and the Free Dissemination of Research
Information, 48 IND. L.J. 503 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Note,
Library Photocopying: Striking A Balance].
23. See, e.g., note 19 supra, accoustical and optical holographs. In addition, self-generated computer programs stored on magnetic tape or punch
cards fall in this category.
24. The Copyright Office allows registration of some unclassified
works such as videotapes of motion pictures or computer programs stored
on magnetic tape or in intelligible print out form. 36 C.F.R. § 202.15(d)
(1973); Symposium, The Impact of the Multiple Forms of Computer Programs and Their Adequate Protection by Copyright, 18 COPYRIGHT L. SYM.
(ASCAP) 92, 100-02 (1968). Registration, although accorded weight by the
courts, is not binding upon them as a determination that the work is copyrightable. Id. at 122-24.
25. "The present Copyright Law of the United States (U.S. Code, Title
17) is an outmoded statute: cumbersome, cluttered, poorly worded and
clumsily arranged. The infringement section, for example, is a verbal
jungle." LINDEY, supra note 5, at xix (Supp. 1973).
26. See notes 138-139 and accompanying text infra.
27. See note 158 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 192-206 and accompanying text infra.
29. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (Commissioner Davis' opinion); 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Court of Claims).
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hear the case and by the Judges of the United States Court of
Claims. Enactment of Copyright revision legislation is dependent
upon the diverse groups involved reaching a satisfactory compromise of their positions.
This Comment is divided into three parts. Part I10 discusses
the development and rationales of the policies of concurrence and
preemption. Part IF' examines the copyright revision program
with emphasis upon its preemptive policy and the past reasons for
the delay in enactment of revision legislation. Finally, part 11132
discusses both the Commissioner's opinion and the court's decision
in the case of Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States, and
the past and potential effects of that litigation upon the diverse
groups that presently impede the progress of the revision program.
I.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONCURRENCE AND PREEMPTION

United States Early Experience

Pursuant to a resolution 33 promulgated by the Continental
Congress urging protection of literary property, all the original
states, except Delaware, enacted copyright legislation before the
Constitution was adopted.3 4 It is however, nowhere mentioned in
the Constitution or the debates upon it, that the Copyright Clause
of the Constitution was intended to abrogate either common law
or state statutory protection of unpublished literary works. 35 The
most authoritative comment upon the purpose of the clause is that
of James Madison who was "intimately associated with the authorship of the patent-copyright clause." 6 He observed that:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.
The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in
Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of these cases,

and most of them -have anticipated the decision of this point
by laws passed at the instance of Congress3 7 (emphasis
added)
30.
31.

See notes 33-134 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 135-180 and accompanying text infra.

32.
33.
34.

See notes 181-320 and accompanying text infra.
BALL, supra note 5, at 30.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess 2 (1909).

35. See Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929).
36.
37.

WICHER, CEiATivE ARTS, supra note 1, at 107.
THE FEDERALIST, No. 43, at 309 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).

Madison's comment on the inability of the States to provide
effective protection for copyrights or patents has been the foundation upon which subsequent judicial opinions have expounded a
need for uniformity in patents and copyrights. This uniformity,
they assert, can only be achieved by federal preemption of state
laws. 38 However, the inability referred to by Madison has most
recently been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, as
relating "to the burden placed on an author or inventor who wishes
to achieve protection in all States when no federal system of protection is available." 39
Subsequent to the passage of the first federal Copyright
statute 40 in 1790, congressional legislation on copyright law extended, inter alia, the scope of copyrightable subject matter,41 the
duration of a copyright, 42 and the remedies available for an infringement. 43 At no time, however, was there federal legislation
enacted to preempt the common law. Moreover, the existing congressional legislation pertaining to federal copyright law, the Act
of 1909, 4 4 expressly retains common law copyright and state rem-

edies for protecting an author's works. 45 No state legislation has
been discovered that recognizes the federal copyright law as preempting state protection. But there have been a few state judicial
decisions 46 to the effect that the federal copyright law preempts
38. 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
39. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556 (1973).

"The evil aimed

at is the lack of adequate power to confer an effective monopoly privilege

that results from the limited territorial sovereignty of the several states."
Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation"Distinction: A False Step in the
Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
1444, 1449 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Note, Copying Misappropriation].
40. Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, 1 STAT. 124 (1790).
41. The original subject matter of copyright was confined to maps,
charts, or books. The Act of April 29, 1802, c. 36, 2 STAT. 171 (1802), added
prints. The Act of February 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT. 436 (1831), added musical
compositions. The Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 STAT. 1082 (1909) added
paintings, drawings, charts, models, etc. which comprise the 14 categories
of copyrightable subject matter under present law.
42. Under the original copyright act, Act of May 31, 1790, c. 18, 1 STAT.
124 (1790), the term of a copyright was 14 years from the date the Title
was recorded, plus a renewal of 14 years upon expiration of the original
term. The Act of February 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT. 436 (1831) extends the
original term to 23 years but retained the renewal at 14 years. The Act
of March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 STAT. 1080 (1909) extended the duration to the
present 28 years for the original term and 28 years for the extension. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 24, 25 (1962). See Cargill, Copyright Duration v. The Constitution, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 917 (1971).
43. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 112 (1962).
44. See note 1 supra.
45. See note 1 supra; Symposium, Section 2 of the Copyright Act: A
Statutory Maverick, 19 COPYRIGHT L. Sym. (ASCAP) 143 (1969).
46. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); G. Ricorde & Co.
v. Handler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); National Comics Publications v.
Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Fashion
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state protection via statute or the common law. Most notable of
these decisions are the opinions of Judge Learned Hand.47 Notwithstanding these decisions, the traditional legislative and overwhelming judicial interpretation 4 has been that the federal and state
governments could concurrently operate in their respective areas
in protection of literary property. This interpretation prevailed
until serious doubts were cast upon it in 1964.
B.

The Emergence of Preemption and Following Confusion

In 1964, two companion cases decided by the Supreme Court
seriously disturbed the traditional view of federal and state concurrence in copyright law. The judicial interpretation that preemption was the congressional intent towards patents and copyrights was expounded in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffell, 49 and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc."0 In each of these cases
a manufacturer brought an action under state laws of unfair competition, to prevent the "copying" of his unpatentable product. The
Supreme Court held that "just as a State cannot encroach upon
the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law,
such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind
that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws." 51 The
preemptive rationale of Sears-Compco rests upon the Supreme
Court's conclusion that the intention of Congress is that there be
"national uniformity in patent and copyright laws .... -52 This
Federalist
conclusion was derived from Madisons' comments in the
5 s
and the Court's inferences from implementing statutes.
Although the preemptive policy of Sears-Compco has "dominated judicial thinking and business planning for almost a decade
.,54the majority of cases decided after Sears-Compcohave given
Originators Guild v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
47. See cases note 46 supra. These cases were, however, relegated to
the status of dicta. See Capital Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d
657 (2d Cir. 1955); W cHxin, CEATIW ARTS, supra note 1, at 89.
48. See notes 1, 10 and accompanying text supra. "[The States have
not relinquished all power to grant to authors the 'exclusive right to their
respective Writings.'" Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973);
"The opinions of this court have been uniform that a concurrent power...
might exist and be exercised by the States." Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591, 604 (1834).
49. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
50.

376 U.S. 234 (1964).

51. 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
52. Id. at 230.
53. 376 U.S. 225, 230 n.7. See notes 4, 36 and accompanying text supra.
54. Goldstein, "Inconsistent Premises" and the "Acceptable Middle

the decisions a narrow interpretation. 5
The lower courts tend to
follow the preemptive rationale only in those cases where the facts
are substantially similar. 50 Although the issue in Sears-Compco
was directly related to federal policy towards patents, 7 the sweeping language of that Court, concerning copyrights has caused
considerable consternation in copyright law. Tape and record
pirates have "sought to rely upon the decisions for protection from
suits by record companies. 58s However, in 1973 the question of
whether a state could by its laws protect an uncopyrightable work
in perpetuity was answered in the affirmative.5 9
C.

Judicial Interpretation Returns to Concurrence-Goldstein v.
California

In the case of Goldstein v. California,° the Supreme Court was
once again faced with the question of deciding whether state copyright laws were preempted by the federal copyright statute. The
Ground:" A Comment on Goldstein v. California, 21 BULL. CR. Soc. 25, 40
(1973) (To his knowledge, the author is not related to the petitioner in the
case commented upon) [hereinafter referred to as Goldstein, "Inconsistent
Premises"].
55. See, e.g., Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d
716 (4th Cir. 1964); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d
774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); Tappan Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 245 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd, 380 F.2d 888
(6th Cir. 1967); Capital Records Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d
878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Documentaries Unlimited Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886
(1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 311
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). Contra, Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. v.
DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1965); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335
F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964); Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 348 Mass.
626, 205 N.E.2d 445 (1965).
56. "Lower state and federal courts have, since the decisions, largely
refused to credit them with the breadth they appear to demand. ....
."
Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of The Copyright Interest, 69 CoLUM.
L. REv. 49, 65 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Goldstein, Federal System
Ordering];
The lower courts, which have considered the question since the
Sears/Compco cases were handed down, will follow the decisions
only in fact situations which are nearly identical with the fact situation in the Sears/Compco cases. However, where fact situations
differ, the courts tend to distinguish these cases and reapply the
old-fashioned princirles of honesty.
Keating, The Inventor's Dilemma: The Right to Copy v. ProprietaryRights,
42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 38, 50 (1967).

See also Symposium, Unfair CompetiCOPYRIGHT L. SyM. (ASCAP)
1 (1965); Note, Copying Misappropriation,supra note 39; Comment, Sound

tion Protection after Sears and Compco, 15

Recordings, Records, and Copyright: Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 33
ALBANY L. REV. 371 (1969).
57. See notes 107 through 134 and accomnanying text infra.
58. Yarnell, Recording Piracy Is Everybody's Burden: An Examination of Its Causes, Effects and Remedies, 20 BULL. Ca. Soc. 234, 241 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as Yarnell, Piracy].

59.
60.

See notes 71-74 and accompanying text infra.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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petitioners, who were engaged in the practice of "tape piracy,"6 1
were charged with 140 violations6 2 of section 653 (h) of the California Penal Code 3 which prohibited the duplication of any sounds
recorded on a phonograph or tape without the consent of the
owner. At trial, petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that section 653 (h) was in conflict with the
"Copyright Clause" and therefore unconstitutional. The trial court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute,6 4 and the appellate court
affirmed.6 5 Petitioners then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
1. ConstitutionalPreemption
The petitioners advanced three arguments against the constitutionality of the California Penal Statute. Their first argument was
predicated on the theory of constitutional preemption 66 and consisted of a two pronged attack based solely upon the language of
the Copyright Clause. They contended that section 653 (h) established a state copyright statute of unlimited duration and thus
61. Tape "piracy" is essentially the unauthorized duplication of performances of major musical artists from original recordings produced and
marketed by recording companies. For a thorough description of pirate
practices and the consequences thereof, see, Tape Industries Asso. of
America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction,401 U.S. 902 (1971) and Yarnell, Piracy, supra note
58, at 234-39. See also Comment, Performers Rights and Copyright: The
Protection of Sound Recordings From Modern Pirates, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 548
(1971); Comment, Record Piracy and Copyright: Present Inadequacies and
Future Overkill, 23 MAINE L. REv. 359 (1971).
62. At trial petitioners pleaded nolo contendre to 10 of the violations
and the remaining charges were dismissed. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 549 (1973).
63. WEST'S CALIFORNIA CODE, PENAL CODE, section 653(h) (1972), provides in part that:
(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be
transferred any sounds recorded in a phonograph record, . . . tapes,
• . . or other article on which sounds are recorded, with intent to
sell or cause to be sold, . . . such actual medium on which such
sounds are so transferred, without the consent of the owner.
64. 412 U.S. 546, 549 (1973).
65. Id.
66. The theory of "constitutional preemption" holds that:
The patent-copyright clause in the Constitution forbids, by
necessary implication, and of its own force, the exercise of state
rower to protect any form of published intellectual property without at least some recognition of, and obedience to, a federally created time limit.
WHIcHER, CREATIVE ARTs, supra note 1, at 97. This theory is chiefly supported by the decisions of Judge Learned Hand and the Sears-Compco cases.
See notes 47, 51 and accompanying text supra.

conflicted with the language contained in the Copyright Clause that
"Congress shall have the power ... [to grant copyrights] ...for
limited times. .... ',67 The Supreme Court rejected the first prong
of petitioners' constitutional preemption argument, concluding that
"under the Constitution, the States have not relinquished all power
to grant to authors 'the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.' "68 In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court made
the following observations about the power of the states to grant
copyright protection. First, the Court stated that the Constitution
neither expressly excludes the States, nor grants exclusively to the
Federal Government, the power to issue copyrights.6 9 Second,
because the subject matter of a copyright could at times be of
purely local interest, the Court could discern no unyielding national
interest that required the inference that state power to grant copyrights had been relinquished to exclusive federal control. 70 Third,
the Court indicated that no conflict will necessarily arise from a
lack of uniformity in state regulation nor would the actual operation of power to grant copyrights by one state significantly prejudice the interest of another.7 1 Finally, the Court declared that
Congress has not determined that the national interest requires
federal protection or freedom from restraint of all categories of
72
writings.
The Supreme Court also rejected the second prong of petitioners' constitutional preemption argument. The Court stated that
the statute could "not be voided for lack of a durational requirement" 73 for two reasons. First, the Court stated that the "or limited
times" language of the Copyright Clause applied only to the protection granted by Congress and was not a limitation upon the duration of state action.7 4 Second, the Court declared that, in contradistinction to the pervasive effects of the federal copyright
monopoly, the effects of the unlimited duration of a copyright monopoly granted by the state was confined to its borders,75 thus any
tendency it had to inhibit further progress in science or the arts
would be narrowly circumscribed.
2.

Supremacy Clause & Statutory Preemption

For their second argument, petitioners contended that section
653(h) conflicted with congressional policy and therefore, must
67. 412 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
68. 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).

See notes 16, 17, and 41 supra for a defi-

nition, meaning, and examples of "Writings."
69.

412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).

70.
71.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.

72.

Id.

73. Id. at 560.
74. Id.

75. "Where Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects
are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach." Id.
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yield to the federal laws under the Supremacy Clause.76 The basis
for this argument was the Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional intent in Sears-Compco 77 where the Court indicated that
Congress intended to establish a uniform federal copyright law to
protect original writings and to allow individuals to freely copy any
work which was not protected by the federal law.7 8 Since section
653 (h) effectively prohibited the copying of works that were not
entitled to federal protection petitioner concluded that the section
was invalid because it conflicted with federal laws. As a supplement to their Supremacy Clause Argument, petitioners also put
forth a statutory preemption 79 argument. They argued that, under
the language of sections 4 and 5 of the federal copyright act, 0 Congress had so occupied the field of copyright protection as to preempt
all comparable state action. 8 '
The Supreme Court repudiated the Supremacy Clause argument. Although expressly reaffirming Sears-Compco,s 2 the majority stated that "Sears-Compco, on which petitioners rely, do not
support their position." 83 The Court held that those cases applied
to instances in which state protection directly conflicted with federal protection and therefore, gave way, under the Supremacy
Clause, to federal policies. In those instances direct conflict re76.

U.S. CONST. art. VI(2).
77. See notes 49-59 and accompanying text supra.
78. 412 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
79. "Preemption" refers to the supplanting of an existing body of
law by a second, later-created law or group of laws dealing with
the same subject matter, when the later rule has been promulgated
by a law-making authority superior to that which originated the
supplanted rule or rules.
WHICHER, CREATIVE ARTS, supra note 1, at 86 n.3. See also Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 473 480 (1955) and Note, The Supreme
Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAv. L. REV. 81, 132-35 (1960). The theory of "statutory preemption," "declares that the federal statute 'occupies the field' of
legal protection for author's published works and thus, under the supremacy
clause, excludes any exercise of power by the states to protect published
'writings.'" WmcHER, CnEArIvE ARTS, supra note 1, at 98. See Kalonder
& Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of Literary
and Artistic Property,72 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (1959).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1962) provides: "The works for which copyright
may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author."
17 U.S.C. § 5 (1962) provides in part: "The above specifications shall not
be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of
this title. . ....
81. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion,
accepts the argument that Congress has preempted the field of copyright
law in favor of free comretition.
82. "Finally, we have concluded that our decisions in Sears and
Compco, which we reaffirm today, have no application in the present case."
412 U.S. 546, 567 (1973).

83. Id.

sulted because state protection had disturbed the careful balance
Congress had drawn with respect to encouraging inventions and
ensuring competition in the sale of identical or substantially similar
products.8 4 In the present case, however, the Supreme Court held
that no comparable conflict exists because Congress has drawn no
balance in the category of works comprising sound recordings
"fixed" prior to February 15, 1972.1 5 The Court also rejected the
statutory preemption argument stating that it has been the consistent interpretation of the Congress, the courts, and the Copyright
Office that Congress has not intended to exercise its authority over
all works to which sections 4 and 5 might apply.8 6
3.

Publication

Petitioners contended, in their final 'argument, that the sound
recordings had been previously released to the public and thus there
had been a publication8 7 of them under federal law. 8 The Supreme
Court dismissed this contention in a footnote stating, inter alia, "as
to categories of writings which Congress has not brought within
the scope of the federal statute, the term [publication] has no
application."8 9 For its conclusion, the Court stated:
Until and unless Congress takes further action with respect
to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, the California Statute may be enforced against acts of piracy such as
those which occurred in the present case. 90
The dissent 91 in Goldstein relies primarily upon the SearsCompco court's interpretation of congressional intent, i.e. federal
policy, that should be applied to the patent-copyright clause. That
court's determination that the federal patent scheme preempts any
84. Id.
85. The term "fixed" means the author's work is in some tangible medium of expression that exhibits the characteristics of permanency or stability. See note 16 supra and note 161 infra.
86. [I]t may be argued that Congress intended to exercise its authority over all works to which the constitutional provision might
apply. However, in the more than 60 years which have transpired
since enactment of [the 1909 Copyright Act], neither the Copyright Office, the courts, nor the Congress has so interpreted it.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 567 (1973).
87. See note 173 infra.
88. See note 1 supra.
89. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
90. Id. at 564.
91. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent is based upon the inference that the
intent of Congress is that there be uniformity in copyright laws, which can
only be achieved by preemption. Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent is based
upon statutory preemption in that, in his view, "Congress has demonstrated
its desire to exercise the full grant of constitutional power." 412 U.S. 546,
577 (1973). He further bases his dissent upon the determination of the intent of Congress, in that, "the silence of Congress would be taken to reflect
a judgment that free competition should prevail." Id. at 578. Both Justices
Douglas and Marshall are joined in their respective dissenting opinions by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun.
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state encroachment upon it 92 is inferred from "the federal policy,
found in art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes.... ."9 This inference, as pertains to patents, is
amply supported by judicial decisions and statutory provisions.94
However, the sweeping reasoning of Sears-Compco implying that
Congress intended, via the patent-copyright clause and its implementing statutes, to preempt state protection of uncopyrighted
works95 is not sustained by the majority of subsequent judicial decisions.9 6 Nor is it sustained by statutory provisions particularly
where the Sears-Compco court was cognizant of the fact that section
29T of the copyright enabling statute98 expressly retains common
law protection of unpublished works that may or may not be copyrighted. 99
The dissent in Goldstein further relies upon the brief excerpt
from Madison's comment that was used by the Sears-Compco Court
to support that Court's conclusion that there was a need for "uniformity" in patent and copyright law.100 However, the SearsCompco Court, unlike the majority in Goldstein, 0 1 did not examine
the circumstances which gave rise to Madison's comment, 10 2 but
merely inferred that the states could not make effective provisions
to protect literary property in the absence of a national system
of protection. In essence, the Sears-Compco Court's determination
of the intent of Congress, as pertains to copyrights, rests upon inferences of inferences. Thus the position of the dissent in Goldstein,
is based upon the congressional intent towards patents,10 3 which
is the essence of the Sears-Compco decision. Consequently, to adopt
their position would, in effect, result in a transfer of the congres10 4
sional intent towards patents over into the field of copyright law.
92. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
94. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
95. "The court did not appear to restrict federal preemption to patent
law, but seemingly extended it to copyright as well ... " Project, supra
note 18, at 989.
96. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 1 supra and Symposium, Section 2 of the Copyright Act:
A Statutory Maverick, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYm. (ASCAP) 143, 169 (1969).
98. Act of March 4, 1909, c. 15, 35 STAT. 1080 (1909).
99. Certain classes of works which are in unpublished form may be
registered with the Copyright Office, 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1962). Examples of
such works include, lectures, motion picture photoplays, photographic
prints, and drawings.
100. 412 U.S. 546, 572 (1973).
101. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
104. "Because copyright law is subject to constraints not applicable to

It is submitted that the making of such a transfer would be
unsound in view of the different natures' 0 5 of patents and copyhas been
rights and the different manner in which each is and
10 6
treated congressionally, judicially, and administratively.
4. Goldstein Distinguished from Sears-Compco-Patents Distinguished from Copyrights
The Goldstein decision has been criticized for the treatment it
accords the Sears-Compco cases.' 0° Although the Supreme Court
expressly reaffirmed the holdings in those cases, "the attempted distinction of Sears and Compco was groundless.. .,"0 for those cases
seemed readily distinguishable upon their facts and did not require
the attempted distinction of the balances drawn by Congress in the
patent and copyright fields. 101 Goldstein was specifically concerned
with the question of whether a state could protect a category of
subject matter not included in those enumerated in the statutory
classification of copyrightable works. Sears-Compco, on the other
hand, were directly concerned with the issue of whether a state

could, by its laws, offer protection of a kind which indirectly
impinged upon the federal patent laws." 0 On the facts, SearsCompco appeared to be minimally, if at all concerned with copy-

rights, however the sweeping language"' of that Court preempts
state protection of copyrights as well as patents.
12
Although both copyrights and patents are limited monopolies
derived from the same constitutional provision, 113 they are distinpatent law, ..., it was reckless for Goldstein to assume that copyright sets
its balance for protection in the same fashion as patents." Goldstein, "Inconsistent Premises" supra note 54, at 34.
105. See notes 121-130 and accompanying text infra.
106. "Although patents and copyrights find their federal basis in the
same clause of the Constitution, the legislative and judicial treatment they
have received has differed materially; copyrights and patents, though related, are yet worlds apart." Rothenberg, supra note 3, at 3-4.
107. Goldstein, "Inconsistent Premises", supra note 54, at 35.
108. Id.
109. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1962).
111. Today we have held in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., that
when an article is unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying
would interfere with the federal policy found in Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8
of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright
laws leave in the Public domain.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
112. The federal copyright law is limited by the Copyright Clause.

Common law or state statutory protection of literary property may exist

in perpetuity but it is not a monopoly since the public may use the work
once it has been disseminated to them by a general publication. See notes
173-74, infra.
113. See note 10 supra. "Although united in this clause, .... the subjects of patents and copyrights have little analogy. They are so widely different that one is property, the other a legalized monopoly." Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 598 (1834).
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guishable as to the nature of the right granted, 114 the subject matter
involved, 115 the standards and procedures for obtaining each, 1 " the
duration of the monopoly granted by each, 117 and the prevailing
8
judicial interpretations of the exclusive domain of each."1
Upon the grant of a patent, the owner (patentee) is given the
right to "exclude others from making, using, or selling" 1 9 any device or process which substantially embodies the ideas or discoveries
claimed in his patent. A copyright, however, grants the owner
thereof only the right to prevent others from "copying" his particular "expression" and not from using any ideas or discoveries that
120
he may disclose.
The standards and procedures for obtaining a patent are much
more stringent than those for obtaining a copyright. The subject
matter of a patent must meet the patentability standards of novelty 12 ' and unobviousness,122 whereas the subject matter of a copyright need only be "original."1 23 It is only the author's "expression"
in a copyrightable work, that must be original. Moreover, two or
more persons who independently create a similar or identical work
may obtain a copyright on it, provided each is an original expression of its respective author. 24 Two patents, however are
never granted on the same invention or discovery, regardless of
whether they were independently or simultaneously made. 25
A patent is issued from the Patent Office only after a thorough
114. See notes 119-120 and accompanying text infra.
115. See notes 121-125 and accompanying text infra.
116. See notes 126-127 and accompanying text infra.
117. See notes 128-130 and accompanying text infra.
118. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
119. The definition of infringement of a patent is contained in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (1962) which provides in part that "whoever without authority,
makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." See also 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154, 163 (1962).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1962). See note 18 supra. An idea or discovery
standing alone, can neither be patented or copyrighted. See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1962); 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1962); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1973).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1962). "Conditions for patentability; novelty and
loss of right to patent".
122. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1962). "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious
subject matter".
123. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1962). See BALL, supra note 5, at 237-38; NIMMEH,
supra note 3, at § 48.
124. "[I]f the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a plurality of copyrights may result, and no infringement
will exist." BALL, supra note 5, at 327.
125. In cases of simultaneous inventions, the first inventor to conceive
of and reduce to practice his discovery is entitled to the patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) (1962).

scrutiny is made of the invention to ascertain its compliance with
the required patentability standards. 126 A copyright, on the other
hand, is granted by the Copyright Office after an examination of
the application form discloses that the form is properly filled out. 12 7
A patent is granted absolutely for a maximum of 17 years.1 28 However, a copyright, under present federal law, is granted for an
original term of 28 years"29 and is renewable for another 28 years
upon the expiration of the original term.1 30
The prevailing judicial interpretation has been that patents are
exclusively in the federal domain. The United States Supreme
Court has stated:
We are willing to admit that this language [PatentCopyright Clause] is broad enough, and is adopted to
transfer to Congress the whole legislation and control over
patents. There is at common law no property in8 them;
there is not even a legal right entitled to protection.' '
However, as previously discussed, there is a sharp dispute as to
whether Congress has exclusive control over the law of copyrights.
In effect, the decision of Goldstein v. California, allows the
states to extend their protection to any category of subject matter
which Congress has not indicated a preference for or against protection of that subject matter. Thus a state may, by either statute
or applicable common law principles, provide greater protection in
duration for works not encompassed by the federal statutory classifications of copyrightable subject matter than the federal government can provide for works that are copyrighted. 1 2 Although
criticized for "knocking the props out from under the Sears-Compco
decisions,"'13 the Goldstein decision has, in effect, limited the preemptive policy of those decisions to state laws that encroach upon
federal patent policy. Thus the decision in Goldstein v. California,
has returned the judicial interpretation of the Copyright Clause to
the traditional, pre-Sears-Compco viewpoint" 4 which sustained the
126. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-15 (1962).
127. "Copyright registration requires mere compliance with statutory
formalities, whereas patents are granted only after the Patent Office has
searched the "prior art" and determined that the invention is novel and useful. RINGER & GITLIN, supra note 16, at 2.
128. A utility or plant patent is issued for a period of 17 years. The
patentee may dedicate his patent to the public at any time during the 17
year period. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1962). A design patent may be granted for
a period of 3 , 7 or a maximum of 14 years. A patent cannot be renewed.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1962).
130. Id. But see note 154 and accompanying text infra.
131. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 601 (1834). The federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising under the patent
laws. United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U.S. 548 (1895);
American Harley Corp. v. Irwin Industries, Inc., 315 N.Y.S.2d 129, 27 N.Y.2d
168, 263 N.E.2d 552 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1970).

132. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
133. Goldstein, "Inconsistent Premises," supra note 54, at 40.
134. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
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concurrent operation of federal and state laws in the protection of
literary property.
Although judicial determinations sustain the concurrent operation of federal and state laws, Congress, in its plans to revise the
federal copyright statute, intends to preempt all state protection
of literary property in the nature of copyright protection.
II.
A.

COPYRIGHT

REVISION

Need For Revision

It is now virtually undisputed that there exists an urgent need
for revision of the present federal copyright laws. 135 The primary
reason for this revision is to extend federal copyright protection
to those areas of copyright law which have been rendered obsolete
by technology. 136 Another important reason for revision is to
establish a means for studying and amassing information on the
effects of scientific advancements upon copyright law and to supply
that information to Congress so that it may make adequate legislative responses to those advancements. 137 As a result of these and
other reasons, Congress has been engaged in a program for more
than 18 years to enact legislation for the general revision of the
federal copyright laws. 138 The most recent effort at revision is re135. "[E]verybody agrees that we need a revision. . . ." 118 CONG.
REC. 9621 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1972) (remarks of Congressman Hutchinson).
But see Henn, Copyright Law Revision: Paragonor Paradox?, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 477, 520 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Henn, Paragon or Paradox?].
It has been contended that the entire system of copyright protection should
be abrogated, see Breyer, Uneasy Case For Copyright-A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as Breyer, Uneasy Case for Copyright].
This contention, however, has been strenuously rejected. See Tyerman,
Economic Rationale For Copyright Protectionfor Published Books: A Reply
To Professor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1100 (1971) [hereinafter referred
to as Typerman, Economic Rationale].
136. "The guiding premise of the revision program has been that the
tremendous changes in technology that have taken place since 1909, which
have fostered entire new industries and new methods for the reproduction
of literary and artistic works, have rendered the present copyright law obsolete. . . ." Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 1853. See note 15 and
accompanying text supra.
137. See Dole, Jr., Forward: Copyright Problems-Twenty-First Century Style, 53 IowA L. REV. 805, 808-09 (1968). "As Senate action with respect to the National Commission indicates, the technological revolution
threatens to outdate the copyright revision bill shortly after its enactment."
Id. See note 158 and accompanying text infra.
138. The revision program began in earnest in 1955 with a $20,000 congressional appropriation for a three year study to be conducted by the
Copyright Office. From 1955 to 1961, more than thirty-five separate studies
were conducted on various aspects of copyright law revision. These studies

flected in Senate Bill S. 1361, introduced by Senator John J.
McClellan on March 26, 1973.139
Originally proposed as a three year study,140 the copyright revision program has been faced with various obstacles in the more
than eighteen years since it was initiated by the Copyright Office
in 1955.141 The first obstacle encountered was the gross underestimating of the magnitude of the undertaking and the amount
of time required to complete the initial studies. 142 After more than
six years and many discussions and disagreeements between opposing forces, there appeared the first report on the revision program.
It contained the results of some thirty-five separate studies on
various aspects of copyright law. 14
Almost nine years after the
inception of the plan, the first bill for the general revision of the
federal copyright law was introduced in the House of Representatives. 4 4 Since that time numerous hearings and reports have been
145
introduced into Congress.
are reprinted in

STUDIES ON COPYUGHr LAw-AnTIUR FISCHER MEMORIAL ED

TION (1963). (Arthur Fischer was the Register of Copyrights who started
the revision program). The first report from the Copyright Office appeared
in 1961. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, reprinted in 2 Studies on Copyright LawArthur Fischer Memorial Edition, 1199 (1963). Drafting of proposed sections of copyright revision began in 1964 and since that time a series of
more than thirteen bills have been introduced into Congress. See S. 3008,
H.R. 11947, H.R. 123549, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); S. 1006, H.R. 4347, H.R.
6831, H.R. 6835, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 597, H.R. 2512, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 644, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); and S. 1361, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). "Except for technical changes relating to the effective dates of various provisions, the
[present] bill [S. 1361] is identical to S. 644 of the 92nd Congress. That
bill, other than for minor amendments is identical to the bill [S. 543] reported by the subcommittee in December 1969." 119 CONG. REc. 5615 (daily
ed. Mar. 26, 1973) (remarks of Senator McClellan). S. 543 is substantially
similar to H.R. 2512 which was passed by the House of Representatives in
1967.
Numerous hearings have been conducted before Congress on revising
the present copyright law. See, e.g., Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15;
Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
[hereinafter referred to as Hearings S. 597]; HearingsOn S. 1361 Before the
Subcomm. On Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
On The Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter referred to as
Hearings S. 1361].
139. See "Statements On Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions," 119
CONG. REc. 5615 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1973) (Senator McClellan is Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights. Subsequent to the writing of this article, S. 1361 passed the Senate on September 9, 1974 but was not acted upon by the House of Representatives
and died in the 93d Congress. It will presumably be reintroduced in the
House in 1975 and undergo a series of hearings by the House Judiciary
Committee.
140. See note 138 supra.
141. Id.
142.
143.

See Henn, Paragon or Paradox?,supra note 176, at 479-82.
See note 138 supra.

144. Id.
145. Id.
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The primary obstacles preventing the enactment of any of the
earlier bills were the oppposing interest of the many diverse groups
testifying at the hearings before the House of Representatives. The
major controversial interests involved gravitated around four issues:
(1) the jukebox exemption; 146 . (2) the manufacturing
148
clause; 147 (3) the exemptions sought by educators and libraries;
and (4) the community antenna television (C.A.T.V.) royalty provisions. 149 Having reached, to their satisfaction, resolution of the
issues involved, the House of Representatives passed a copyright
revision bill in 1967.150
Upon reaching the Senate, however, the revision program was
stymied by the resurgence of the C.A.T.V. issue.'
Languishing
in the Senate through the 90th and 91st Congresses, the revision
program received new impetus upon the adoption of a C.A.T.V. regulatory scheme by the Federal Communications Commission on
February 3, 1972.152 Thereafter it was thought that legislative
enactment on copyright law revision would soon follow. 15 However, the enactment of the present copyright bill, S. 1361 has been
delayed by the re-emergence of the opposing interests of educators
and libraries vis-a-vis publishers.
The thrust of the major provisions of S. 1361, is to provide
greater protection, in length and subject matter, for the present
and reasonably forseeable future categories of copyrightable works.
146.

Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 33. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e)

(1962).

147. HearingsH.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 36. See 17 U.S.C. § 16 (1962).
148. See generally Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15. See notes 224247 and accompanying text infra.
149. See Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 34-36; Hearings S. 1361,
supra note 138, at 278-490; Comment, Cable Compromise: Integration of
Federal Copyright and Telecommunication Policies, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 340
(1973); Note, CATV and Copyright Liability: The Final Decision, 1 CONN.
L. REV. 401 (1968).

150. H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See note 138 supra.
151. "Progress on the revision bill had to await the adoption by the
Federal Communications Commission of a new cable television regulatory
scheme." 119 CONG. REc. 5615 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1973) (remarks of Senator
McClellan). "When that omnibus bill went over to the [Senate] they got
into a jam because of CATV, and they could not unravel that jam....
Senator McClellan made clear that he would not let the omnibus bill out
until that had been settled." 118 CONG. REc. 9619 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1972)
(remarks of Congressman Celler).
152. "[Tlhe adoption of the FCC cable television rules removes the barrier to progress on copyright revision, and creates a real prospect for enactment of the revision bill in the 93rd Congress." 118 CONG. REC. 9619 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1972) (recital by Congressman Celler from report authored by
Senator McClellan).
153. Id.

The duration of a copyright will be increased from the present federal maximum of 56 years to a new limit of life plus 50 years. 154
This provision will not only afford greater protection to copyright
owners in terms of the length of protection, but will also more
closely align United States copyright law with that of other nations. 155 The scope of subject matter susceptible to copyright protection has been broadened to more adequately respond to present
and reasonably forseeable technological innovations that will affect
literary property interests. 1 6 Under this provision sound recordings
will finally receive permanent national protection from the egregious actions of "pirates." 157 Acknowledging the fact that the law
154. Senate Bill S. 1361, § 302. Hearings S.1361, supra note 179, at 42.
[S. 1361 is reprinted in Hearings S. 1631, supra note 179, at 3-87). For the
present term of a copyright, see note 41 supra.
155.

".

.

. we increased the copyright tenure of new copyrights from

28 years, plus a renewal of 28 years, until the entire life of the owner of
the copyright, plus 50 years after his death, which conformed with the international copyright laws in existence all over the world in civilized countries." "Copyright Protection in Certain Cases," 118 Cong. Rec. 9619 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1972) (remarks of Congressman Celler) (The copyright owner
referred to is a natural person who is the author of the work. A corporation, which may exist in perpituity, can own a copyright and is more appropriately termed a copyright "proprieter"). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 100-03 (1967); Dubin, Copyright Duration, 53 IowA L. REv. 810,
830 (1968); Diamond, 1960 ABA Symposium--Duration, 13 BULL. CR. Soc.
25 (1965). But see Henn, Paragon or Paradox?, supra note 135, at 515-17
(1969); Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright,
56 GEO. L.J. 1050 (1968).

156.

S.1361, § 102. Subject Matter of Copyright: In General, provides

in part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, .. , in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings.
Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 8 (emphasis added). The term "or later
developed" is intended to cover new technological developments. The
phrase "or with the aid of a machine or device," will counter the "intelligible notation" test of the White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co.
case, supra note 18. Video tapes, TV cassettes, and sound recordings are
expressly included as copyrightable subject matter.
157. Id. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. See Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19-20, 26 (Supp. 1973),
amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19-20, 26 (1970). This amendment provides
"limited copyright protection for sound recordings in order to prevent unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings and to suppress the 'unethical and unfair business competition' of unlicensed duplicators." Note,
Constitutional Limitations Upon the Congressional Power to Enact Copyright Legislation, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 534 (1972). See also Note, The Sound
Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy On the High C's?, 40 GEO. WAsH.
L. REv. (1972); NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 35.1.
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has not adequately maintained its pace with that of the technological community, S. 1361 also provides for a "National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works." The purpose of
this Commission is:
to study and compile data on: the reproduction and use
of copyrighted works of authorship . . . [and to] make re-

commendations as to such changes in copyright law or procedures that may be necessary to assure for such purposes
access to copyrighted works, and to provide recognition of
the rights of copyright owners. 58
B.

Preemptive Policy of Revision-A Single Federal System

Ostensibly in response to the preemptive nature of the SearsCompco decisions, "1 the policy of the revision program has been
to "establish a single system of statutory protection for all works
whether published or unpublished.'

16 0

This preemptive policy of

the revision program is reflected in section 301 of S. 1361.161 The
stated purpose of this section is to abolish all state protection which
158.

S. 1361, Title II, § 2(b) (c), Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at

72.
159. "In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., Section 301 is ... intended to have a preemptive
effect . . ." where the cause of action essentially involves rights that are
equivalent to copyright. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1967).
It was urged by some commentators, prior to the Sears-Compco cases, "that
an exclusive federal system covering all literary and artistic property,
whether published or unpublished, [would] promote uniformity and certainty in the law by taking the protection of unpublished works out of the
hands of the several states and investing federal law with sole jurisdiction."
Finklestein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 1025,
1061 (1956).
160. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 23.
161. § 301 Pre-Emption With Respect to Other Law
(a) [A]ll rights in the nature of copyright in works that come
within the subject matter of copyrights as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to copyright, literary property
rights, or any equivalent legal or equitable right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of a State with respect to:
(1) unpublished material that does not come within the
subject of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including
works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expres-

sion;

(3) Activities violating rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyrights
as specified by section 106, including breaches of contract, breaches
of trust, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false representation. Hearings S. 1361,
supra note 138, at 42 [emphasis added].

comes within the nature of copyright protection of subject matter
that is copyrightable under sections 102 and 103 of S. 1361.126
In order for state law to be preempted by section 301, two conditions must be met. First, the work for which protection is sought
must be within the scope of copyrights as set out in sections 102
and 103.163 The second condition which must be met is that the
right, which is sought to be vindicated by state action, must not
be "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the scope of
copyright." 1 4 Nor can it be a "copyright literary property right,
or any equivalent legal or equitable right" that is presently available under the common law or a state statute. 16" In general, if
the nature of the right sought to be protected is that of reproduction, distribution, preparation of derivative works, performance, or
display, 166 the right that is sought to be protected falls within the
exclusive rights enumerated in section 106167 of S. 1361 and cannot

be protected by state statutes or the common law.
To partially alleviate the burden of determining rights equivalent to copyright, the authors of the revision program have expressed the intention that:
The evolving common law right of "privacy," "publicity," and trade secrets, and the general laws of defamation
and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the causes
of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal
rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are
different in kind from copyright infringement .... 168
Where the right sought to be vindicated contains elements different
in kind from copyright and also rights similar ,to copyright-for
162. Id.

163. Id. See note 156 and accompanying text supra. Ideas, plans, pro-

cedures, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, discoveries and
any works not fixed in any tangible medium of expression do not fall within
the purview of subject matter protected by S. 1361 or the present copyright
act. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 42.
164. S. 1361, § 301(b) (3). See Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 42.
165. Under the auspices of S. 1361, § 301(b) (3), "federal preemption
turns upon whether any particular state doctrine embodies rights equivalent
to copyright; to the extent that equivalency exist, the state doctrine is preempted." Goldstein, Federal System Ordering,supra note 56, at 73.
166. S. 1361, § 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works provides in
part that:
Subject to sections 107 through 117, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of the following:
(1) to reproduce . . .in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works...;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords . . . to the public by
sale, lease or other transfer of ownership;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works and sound recordings, to perform the work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, . . ., pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, ... , to display the copyrighted work publicly.
167. Id.
168. H.R. REP. No. 93, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1967).
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example, the "right of privacy"-the determination of whether state
jurisdiction is preempted will depend upon whether "vindication
of that right . . . truly protects an author against an 'invasion of

personal rights' "169 Where the cause of action contains elements
that are essentially similar to copyright, such as "misappropriation,' 170 state jurisdiction is intended to be preempted under section
301 of S. 1361. However, in the majority of cases the determination
of whether state jurisdiction is preempted17or not, will "depend upon
the particular circumstances of the case." '
The basic reasoning behind the preemptive policy of section 301,
is that "the present dual system is anachronistic, uncertain, impractical and highly complicated."'1 2 One of the major factors contribbuting to the uncertainty and complexity of the present system of
duality is "the concept of publication [which] has been seriously
distorted and now bedevils much of the law of copyright."'1 73 This
169. Comment, Preempting State Unfair Competition Protection Under
the Proposed Copyright Revision, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 115, 127 (1969)
[hereinafter referred to as Comment, Preempting State Protection]; Goldstein, Federal System Ordering, supra note 56, at 73-79. Examples of rights
that contain elements "different in kind" from those of copyright infringement, and as such would be reserved to state jurisdictions are: the rights
to prevent unauthorized "exploitation of a person's name or photograph for
commercial advertising; . . . use of a title of a work in such a way as to
constitute passing off or fraud; [and] . . . disclosure and exploitation of a
trade secret." Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 84.
170. "However, where the cause of action involves . . . 'misappropriation,' which is nothing more than copyright protection under another name,
section 301 is intended to have a preemptive effect." H.R. REP. No. 93, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1967). Cf. Goldstein, Federal System Ordering, supra
note 63, at 75-76. But see Comment, The MisappropriationDoctrine After
Sears-Compco, 2 U. SAN. FRAN. L. Rpv. 292 (1968).
The misappropriation doctrine has always been considered by
both its advocates and its critics as an area of unfair competition
law totally separate from copyrights, either statutory or common
law. The . . . cases have always held that if the 'rights claimed
by the plaintiff are . . . the subject of protection under existing
copyright laws,' the misappropriation doctrine would not apply.
Id. at 316.
171. Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 85.
172. Henn, Paragonor Paradox?,supra note 138, at 491.
173. Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. Rsv. 469, 488 (1955). The copyright act does
not define the term publication and its meaning has been left to the courts
to decide. NIvnEs, supranote 3, at § 46.
When the word 'publication' is used without qualification, a
general publication is meant . . . [I]n a broad sense it may be
defined as an 'edition offered to the public for sale or circulation;
or the sale, circulation or distribution of copies with the author's
consent for the purpose of communicating a knowledge of the contents of the work to the general public.'
BALL, supra note 5, at 130-31. "What amounts to a publication may vary
with the nature of the work under consideration." Id. at 32. "Unrestricted

problem of publication, its diverse interpretations, and its concommitant complex concepts of "limited," "dedicatory," "divestive," and
"investive" publications would be eliminated under section 301.174
That section would abrogate the common law, provide unitary federal protection at the creation of the work, and, thereby, abolish
the need for publication as the dividing line between common law
17
and statutory protection of literary property.
Another reason for preemption is to prevent state protection
of unpublished works in perpetuity. In so doing, section 301 would
sale or free distribution of one or more copies to the public will publish
a work." RINGER & GITLIN, supra note 16, at 5. However, the submission
of a manuscript to a publisher, a reviewer, or friends, or sale of the manuscript for publication will not ordinarily constitute a publication. The public performance of a dramatic work, motion picture or song will not ordinarily constitute a publication. Id. at 6. "A telecast reaching millions may
not publish a work, but sales of two or three copies of a book may do so."
Id. "Publication is the dividing line between the common law jungle and
the statutory swamp in the law of literary property ....

There is one

touchstone that does remain constant, and that is the fact that the line always exist. The literary traveler is either in one or the other of the areas,
but with one exception [17 U.S.C. § 12] never in both." Harris, III, Publication: The Fine Line, 11 AF JAG L. REV. 372 (1969).
174. The House Judiciary Committee termed the concept of "publication," "'the most serious defect' of the present copyright law." Cary, The
Quiet Revolution In Copyright: The End of the "Publication Concept," 35
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 652 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Cary, Quiet Revolution]. "[A] limited publication which communicates the contents of a
manuscript to a definite selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale, is considered
a "limited publication" which does not result in a loss of the author's common-law right to his manuscript." White v. Kimmelli, 193 F.2d 744, 74647 (9th Cir. 1952). "Publication without compliance with [statutory notice
requirements] is held to work a forfeiture of the novelist's exclusive rights,
it casts the work into the public domain, a process euphemistically called
"dedication." Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of
PhonographRecords, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 470 (1955). Case law indicates
that:
determining what constitutes publication for the purpose of divesting a creator of a common law copyright is properly left to state
courts, while determining what constitutes publication in order to
ascertain whether a creator has met the condition precedent for a
statutory copyright-i.e. for purposes of investing protection in an
author-is left to the federal courts.
Symposium, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco, 15
COPYRIGHT L. SYn. (ASCAP) 1, 62 (1967).
175. Although at one time, when works were disseminated almost
exclusively through printed copies, 'publication' could serve as a

practical dividing line between common law and statutory protection, this is no longer true. With the development of the 20th century communications revolution, the concept of publication has become increasingly artificial and obscure. To cope with the legal
consequences of an established concept that has lost much of its
meaning and justification, the courts have given 'publication' a
number of diverse interpretations, some of them radically different.

Not unexpectedly the results in individual cases have become unpredictable and often unfair.
"After an initial attempt at defining publication, the . . . [revision] draftsmen resolved the problem by purporting to avoid it, eliminating state jurisdiction over common law copyright in but certain instances." Goldstein,
Federal System Ordering,supra note 56, at 53.
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"eliminate the great practical difficulties which have plagued
scholars involved in attempting, long after the death of a person
whose writings are being studied, to ascertain the

. . .

appropriate

1 6
persons from whom to seek permission to publish."
In view of Goldstein's determination that the states have not
relinquished all power to grant copyrights, it could be asserted that
the preemptive policy of S. 1361 is unconstitutional on the grounds
that it violates Article X of the Constitution which reserves to the
states those powers not delegated to or prohibited by the Constitution. This argument would be valid if section 301 could only be
supported by an inference of constitutional preemption. 1'7 7 However, the preemptive policy of S. 1361 is readily supported under
-the theory of statutory preemption. 178 Congress makes it clear,
by section 301, that it intends to occupy the field of copyright law
to the exclusion of state statutes or the common law. Therefore,
any state laws that provided protection in the nature of a copyright
would impinge upon the congressional policy of preemption and,
under the Supremacy Clause, 1 9 must give way to the federal policy
in section 301 or S. 1361. However, copyright revision legislation
embodying this preemptive policy has been delayed and is yet to
be passed by the Senate. The primary reason for the delay in the
Senate revolves around the issues of photocopying and "fair use"
and the case of Williams and Wilkins Company v. United States. 8 0

III.

PHOTOCOPYING-WILLIAMS
OPERATION"

& WILKINS, A "HOLDING

BY THE COURT OF CLAIMS

A. Background
1. The groups involved. One of the major reasons for the
present delay in enacting S. 1361 is the pressure exerted by "one
of the most powerful lobbying groups at the congressional hearings"'' 1 and the "only major organized group [representing] copyright users", 8 2 the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions
176. Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at
177. See note 66 supra.
178. See note 79 supra.
179. See notes 76-85 and accompanying text supra.
180. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. C1. 1973).
181. Symposium, Education and Copyright Law: An Analysis of the
Amended Copyright Revision Bill and Proposals for Statutory Licensing
and a Clearinghouse System, 20 COPYRIGHT L. Syw. (ASCAP) 1, 3 n.6 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Symposium, Education and Copyright Law:

Analysis of Revision Bill].
182. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 181. The Ad Hoc Committee
represents the interest of teachers, professor, school administrators, elected

and Organizations on Copyright Laws Revision. Joined with the
Ad Hoc Committee are several associations of research libraries.' 83
Diametrically opposed to the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee and
8 4
the research libraries are various associations of publishers.
Primarily representing the interest of educators, the major concern of the Ad Hoc Committee, and also the libraries, is the unfavorable ruling of the Commissioner's opinion in Williams and Wilkins
Company v. United States'"5 and the decision's precedential value.
In addition, the libraries also fear suits against their employees 8 6
as a result of the favorable position accorded the publishers by the
Commissioner's opinion.
The extremely limited decision rendered by the United States
Court of Claims on the appeal of Commissioner Davis' opinion
establishes no ground to alleviate the fears of the educators or
libraries as a group.18 7 Instead the ruling of the majority of the
court seems more likely to cause these diverse groups to intensify
their lobbying efforts before Congress to obtain a favorable position
in the proposed new copyright revision legislation. 88 However,
before discussing either the Commissioner's opinion' 89 or the
holding of the court'90 in the Williams and Wilkins case and their
unsettling effects upon the diverse groups involved, it is necessary
school board members, educational broadcasters, librarians, and students.
It is comprised of 41 educational organizations.
183. Included in the library research associations at the 1973 hearings
are: Association of Research Libraries; American Library Association; Special Libraries Association; and the Medical Library Association. See Hearings S. 1361, supra note 179, at 89-113.
184. The organizations representing the publishers include: American
Chemical Society; Harcourt Broce Jovanovich, Inc. and MacMillan, Inc.;
American University Press Association; Association of American Publishers,
Inc.; American Business Press, Inc. and the Williams and Wilkins Company.
Also representing the publishing interest are the Authors League of America, Inc. and the Information Industry Association.
Reflecting the rapid pace of technological changes, the Information Industries Association did not exist when the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 2512 in 1967. The Association made its first appearance before Congress on the Hearings on S. 1361 in August of 1973. "Information companies
create information, refine information, organize information, and develop
access tools for getting at information

...

"

via computers and other devices.

Hearings S. 1361, supra note 179, at 271.
-185. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972). "Tradition and precedent play an
important role in the judicial development of the law. But there is little

case precedent to guide the courts with respect to permissible uses by teach-

ers and researchers. Cases simply did not come up in this area." Hearings
S. 1361, supra note 138, at 203 (Statement, Ass'n of American Law Schools,
The American Ass'n of University Professors and the American Council in

Education).

186. "This threat of suit, even if one is able to maintain his innocence
in court, is very real because suits are costly in proportion to the amount
for which one is sued." Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 105 (Statement
Chairman, Copyright Subcommittee, American Library Ass'n).
187. See notes 296-297 and accompanying text infra.
188. See generally Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138.
189. Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (1972).
190. Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).
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to make a brief examination of "one of the most important and
well established limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright
owners,"'1 1 the doctrine of "Fair Use."
2. Fair Use. The doctrine of fair use was developed by the
courts1 9

2

to avoid the unfair results that would occur if the exclu-

sive rights of the copyright holder were rigidly enforced. 93 Although difficult to define precisely, 194 the gravamen of the doctrine
is that a person, other than the copyright proprietor, may make
a reasonable and limited use of a relatively small portion of the
copyrighted work without obtaining the permission of the copyright
owner. 19 5 In so doing, the person making such "fair use," must
have a valid reason to do so and must not adversely affect the interest of the copyright proprietor. 196 It has been further stated that
the doctrine was designed "to permit limited quotation and copying
from a copyrighted work for purposes which have neither the intent
nor effect of fulfilling the demand for the original work."'1 97 Such
191. H.R. REP. No. 93, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967).
192. Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350
(1973).
The doctrine of "Fair Use" is the "American Counterpart of
Englands 'fair dealing' . . ." doctrine which developed as a result of English
judicial limitations upon the exclusive rights of an author in published
works under the Act of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19, 1710 and the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774). Comment, Copyright
Fair Use-Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L. REv. 73, 74-75 (1968)
[hereinafter referred to as Comment, Fair Use-Case Law]. See Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 343 (C.C.D. Mass. 1891); NimMER, supra note 3, at
§ 145. "The doctrine of 'fair use,' as a balance wheel and safety valve for
the copyright system, was promulgated more than one hundred thirty years
ago, as a judicial rule of public policy." Shulman, Fair Use and the Revi-Sion of the Copyright Act, at 832 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Schulman, Fair Use and Revision].
193. RINGER & GrrLIN, supranote 16, at 30.
194. "Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use
doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged." H.R. REP. No. 93, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967).
195. The explanation of the term "fair use" most widely accepted is that
it is "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." BALL, supra note
5, at 260. See Schulman, Fair Use and Revision, supra note 192, at 833;
Yankwhich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 203, 212 (1955); Comment,
Fair Use--Case Law, supra note 192, at 87 (1969); Symposium, Education
and Copyright: Analysis of Revision Bill, supra note 181 at 5. "[S]ince
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible .
" H.R.
H. REP. No. 93, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967).
196. RINGER & GITLIN, supra note 16, at 31.
197. Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 1704. Commonly accepted
examples of uses that are considered to be fair include reproduction by
hand, or in photocopies or phonorecords "for purposes such as criticism,
comment,, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research." Hearings S.
1361, supra note 138, at 105; RINGER & GITLN, supra note 16, at 31.

uses are technically an infringement of the copyright owners'
rights under the present copyright laws.19 8 However, if the determination is made that the use is fair, the doctrine of "fair use"
is available as a defense that will absolve the infringer of liability'

99

The determination by act of whether a use is fair, is an exceedingly difficult task primarily because of two factors. First, the
diversity of the instances of such use vitiate the precedential effect
of a particular case. Second, there are exigencies in each situation
which must be considered by the courts.2 00 As a consequence of
these factors, there are no fixed rules or criteria 20 1 that have been
set out to determine the fairness of a particular use. Each case
20 2
must be decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances.
However, in the absence of a rigid rule, the courts have set out
a variety of considerations that should be taken into account in
determining the fairness of a use. The foremost of these considerations have been incorporated in the revision program and
include: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
20 3
of the copyrighted work.
The difficulty in determining the fairness of a particular use
is further compounded where there is a dearth of judicial decisions
in point. A court, confronted with such a situation would, of
necessity, grasp at any and all relevant cases to ascertain their suitability as precedents. The occurence of just such a situation is
precisely what the Ad Hoc Committee fears will happen with the
Commissioner's opinion in the Williams and Wilkins case.2 0 4 Although the actual opinion of Commissioner Davis has been reversed
198. BALL, supra note 5, at 260; Symposium, Education and Copyright:
Analysis of Revision, supra note 181, at 5.
199. Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973);
Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 105. "Fair use, then, is really not [a]
right to copy any given thing, but only a defense to be invoked if one is
sued." Id.
200. "[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 93, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967). The "fair
use" doctrine "takes into account that borrowing [from a copyrighted work]
may in some cases constitute actionable infringement, and in other cases
may be justifiable in the public interest and, therefore, not an unlawful appropriation." Schulman, Fair Use and Revision, supra note 192, at 833.
201. "Since no two cases are identical, each must be decided on its own
facts and the claims of the contending parties judged on their own merits."
Schulman, Fair Use and Revision, supra note 192, at 933. For examples
of cases, see Comment, Fair Use-CaseLaw, supra note 192.
202. "[N]o generally applicable definition is possible and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts." H.R. REP. No. 83,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967).
203. S. 1361, § 107 Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use.
204. See notes 224-236 and accompanying text infra.
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by the Court of Claims,205 the exceptionally narrow decision rendered by that court has in no way alleviated the effect of the Commissioner's opinion upon educators, libraries, and publishers. 206
B.

Williams and Wilkins v. United States-The Commissioner's
Opinion and its Effects Upon Educators, Libraries, and
Publishers

1. The Commissioner's Opinion. The Williams and Wilkins
Company, a major publisher of technical trade magazines, instituted
a damages action for copyright infringement against the United
States Government's two principle medical research libraries, the
library of the National Institute of Health (NIH) and the National
Library of Medicine (NLM). 20 7 The alleged infringement consisted
of the libraries practices of photocopying entire articles from four
of the plaintiff's medical trade journals208 and supplying these
205. Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347
(1973).
206. See notes 300-302 and accompanying text infra.
207. The library of the NIH subscribes to about 3,000 different journal
titles each year, including those of the Williams and Wilkins Company. The
NIH itself employs over 12,000 employees of which 4,000 are science professionals who may request photocopies up to 50 pages in length of any entire
journal article for assistance in their ongoing projects or simply for background reading.
The library [NIH] does not monitor the reason for requests or
the use to which the photocopies are put. The photoconies are not
returned to the library; and the record shows that, in most instances, researcherskeep them in their private files for future reference.
Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (1973)
(emphasis added). In 1970, the NIH library filled 85,744 requests for
photocopies amounting to more than 930,000 pages. On the average a
journal article is about 10 pages, thus the NIH library made about 93,000
photocopies of journal articles. Id.
The NLM is "a repository of much of the world's medical literature,
in essence a 'librarian's library'." Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345, 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (emphasis supplied). NLM is the "mother
library" for the "interlibrary loan program." Under the interlibrary loan
program, NLM supplies, upon request, free photocopies, up to 50 pages in
length, on a no-return basis to both public and private research-and-education oriented institutions and to individuals. In 1968 NLM made more than
120,000 photocopies of journal articles of which more than 14,000 copies
were sent to private and commercial organizations (particularly drug companies). Id., at 1348-51. In 1970 both libraries made a total of 179,590 photocopies from technical journals.
208. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 674 (1972). The four journals involved were
Medicine, Journal of Immunology, Gastroenterology, and Pharmacological
Reviews. At the time suit was brought, the annual subscriptions to these
journals ranged from about 3,100 (PharmacologicalReviews) to about 7,000
(Gastroenterology) and the annual subscription rates ranged from about $12
to $44. See Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347

photocopies, rather than loaning the journals, to researchers and
other libraries through the inter-library loan program.20 9 The government, joined by several associations of research libraries, relied
primarily upon the two traditional defenses of "non-infringement"
and "fair use." 210
Claiming the defense of non-infringement, the government contended that the exclusive right of the copyright owner "to copy"
his work, was not intended by Congress to prohibit single copy
photoduplication of an article by a library. The government
further contended that the term "copy" applied only to making
multiple copies for distribution. 211 Commissioner Davis of the
Court of Claims rejected the government's claims stating:
[T]he courts have held that the duplication of a copyrighted work, even to make a single copy, can constitute
infringement. [In addition,] there is nothing in the copyright statute or the case law to distinguish, in principle,
the making of a single copy of a copyrighted work from
the making of multiple copies ....212

He further found that there was no difference between copying an
article or the entire periodical for "each article in plaintiff's journal
is protected from infringement to the same extent as the entire
2 13
journal issue.
Asserting its second major defense, the government contended
that the photocopying performed by the libraries was for educational and research purposes and as such was a defense to infringement under the doctrine of "fair use. ' 21 4 The Commissioner rejected this defense as well. In so doing, he apparently "disregarded
all criteria except one and focused his attention on the loss of
potential income by the copyright proprietor."2' 15 He determined
that "wholesale photocopying" of an entire article would undoubtedly lead to a loss in subscriptions which would lead to an increase
in rates to remaining subscribers which would lead to a further
loss in subscriptions. He concluded that this would result in "a
vicious cycle which [would] only bode ill will for medical publishing." 21 6 Taking into account the fact that the number of subscrip(Ct. Cl. 1973). "The majority of journal publishers encourage photoduplication of their articles." Id.
209. Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347
(1973). The practice of the NLM is to photocopy the article requested
rather than loan the journal. 487 F.2d 1345, 1348 (1973). For a brief
description of the interlibrary loan program, see note 207 supra.
210. See Note, Library Photocopying: Striking a Balance, supra note
22, at 505.
211. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 676-77 (1972).
212. Id. at 678.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 680. See note 199 and accompanying text supra.
215. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 97. (Statement, Director of
Ass'n of Research Libraries). 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679 (1972).
216. Id. at 673. See note 207 supra; Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138,
at 151-52.
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tions to medical journals was generally low, the Commissioner
determined that the libraries photocopying practices would ultimately drive the journals out of print, and that, as a result of their
detrimental effect upon the Williams and Wilkins Company's
potential subscription market, the photocopying practices of the
library of NIH and the NLM were not a "fair use" of the company's
copyrighted works. 217 Thus, as a result of the Commissioner's opinion, a library cannot make a photocopy of an entire article in a
periodical unless it first secures authorization from the copyright
21
owner. 8
The Commissioner's opinion has been severely criticized as
being "inconsistent with the understanding of the House Judiciary
Committee on the meaning of 'fair use.' "219 The Committee, in proposing the statutory codification of fair use, intended section 107220
of S. 1361 to have the same meaning as the judicially created doc2 21
trine of fair use had prior to the Williams and Wilkins case.
Further, the Committee did not intend to change, narrow, or enlarge this doctrine in any respect. 222

The initial impact of the

Williams and Wilkins case, however, is that "the Commissioner's
ruling has caused considerable consternation and alarm within the
educational community not only because of its effect on libraries
but also because it would undercut the accepted and traditional
223
meaning of fair use for teachers."
2. Effect of Commissioner's Opinion Upon Educators
The fear that pervades the educational community is the firmly
entrenched belief that the House Judiciary Committee's previously
expressed concepts and views as to the meanings of judiciallydetermined "fair use" 22 4 have been abrogated to the detriment of
217.

172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679-80 (1972).

218. See Note, Library Photocopying: Striking a Balance, supra note
22, at 503 (quoting North, Williams and Wilkins-The Great Leap Backwards, 3 AM. LIBRARIES 528 (1972)).

219.

Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 207 (memorandum of law,

Nat' School Bds.'s Ass'n).
220. S. 1361, § 107, LIMrrA ioNs ON EXECUTIVE RIGHTS: FArR USE, provides
in part that: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use

of a copyrighted work, . . ., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-

right." Hearings S.1361, supra note 138, at 10.
221. See notes 227-228 and accompanying text infra.
222.
223.

I.R. REP. No. 93, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967).
Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 185 (Statement of Ad Hoc

Comm.).
224.

Id. at 176.

libraries, teaching and scholarship, by the reasoning of Commissioner Davis' opinion in Williams and Wilkins.22 Because of the
unavailability of judicial precedents expounding upon the meaning
of "fair use,"226 as applied to non-profit schools, the House Committee set forth examples of teaching activities which it would
consider as falling under the judicial doctrine of "fair use." One
example was the "limited right for a teacher to make a single copy
of an 'entire' work for classroom purposes. ' 227 It was the understanding of the House Committee that this limited right to make
a copy of an "entire" work "was not generally intended to extend
beyond a 'separately cognizable' or 'self-contained' portion (for
example, a single story or article) in a collective work....
With this limitation in mind, the House Committee stated that "the
requested privilege of making a single copy appears appropriately
to be within the scope of fair use." 229 However, under the economic
detriment rationale 230 of Commissioner Davis' opinion, the reproduction by a teacher of an entire article from a periodical or book,
for use in the classroom, may or may not be a fair use where such
reproduction would adversely effect the potential market for the
copyrighted work.
The educators, in light of the Commissioner's opinion, consider
it unsafe and unwise to rely on the House Judiciary Committee's
231
understandings and interpretations of the doctrine of "fair use.
Therefore, they contend that the doctrine of fair use alone is insufficient to provide the certainty that they need for their protection. 232

They propose that Congress adopt their concept of a

"limited educational exemption" 23 3 in addition to the "fair use" provision of section 107, S. 1361 and that Congress further "accompany
it with a clear statement of legislative intent" 23 4 to negate the
precedential effect of the Commissioner's opinion. Their contention
is that the "limited educational exemption" they offer, would secure
to them greater protection by providing: (1) certainty as to what
practices of teachers in classrooms would be permissible; (2) freedom from the aura of commercial competition that has dominated
cases interpreting the meaning of fair use; (3) a shift of the burden
of proof, in cases of infringement, from the teacher to the publisher;
and (4) protection in the event other cases are decided similar to
the Commissioner's opinion.23 5 If the limited educational exemp225. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
226. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1966).
227. HearingsS. 1361, supra note 138, at 208.
228. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1967).
229. Id.
230. See Note, Library Photocopying: Striking a Balance, supra note
22, at 507.
231. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 209.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 185. See note 236 and accompanying text infra.
234. Id. at 202.
235. Id. at 209.
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tion is unacceptable to Congress, the Ad Hoc Committee states that
it:

will be unable to support the proposed legislation (S. 1361)
unless...:
(1) . . . the bill specifically provides adherence to the

concepts and meanings of "fair use" which were written
into House Report No. 93, 90th Congress, as amended in
the following respects:
(b) the authorization for classroom purposes for limited multiple copying of short whole works, such as poems,
articles, stories, and essays;
(2)...

the decision of the Commissioner in the

Williams and Wilkins case is specifically rejected to the extent236which it differs from that House Report, as amended.
In short, what the educators offer Congress is the alternative
of either accepting their "limited educational exemption" or expressly stating that it is the intention of Congress that the doctrine
of "fair use," as codified in section 107 of S. 1361, shall have those
concepts and traditional interpretations as understood by the House
Judiciary Committee prior to the Commissioner's opinion in the
Williams and Wilkins case. Should Congress choose neither alternative, the Ad Hoc Committee will intensify its lobbying efforts to
oppose the adoption of S. 1361 as it is presently drafted.
3. Effect of Commissioner'sOpinion Upon Libraries
The majority of library associations support the Ad Hoc
Committee's "limited educational exemption" 237 and in particular
its request for a clear and express statement of the congressional
intent as to the meaning of fair use. 238 The Commissioner's opinion
in Williams and Wilkins has had a more immediate and direct effect
upon the libraries than the educators for it expressly holds that
their present photocopying practices constitute an infringement of
the publisher's copyright. 239 It is the libraries contention that "in
view of this opinion, it is apparent that fair use can no longer be
considered adequate assurance for the continuation of customary
236.
237.
238.
use is.
S. 1361,
239.

Id. at 186.
Id.
"We are wanting by this amendment to state definitely what fair
That is so we can know and not be subject to suits." Hearings
supra note 138, at 102.
See notes 216-218 and accompanying text supra.

library services .. ,"240 such as providing a photocopy of an entire
article from a journal. They seek freedom from the threat of harassment litigation that may be brought against a librarian who
would photocopy from a copyrighted work. If such freedom is not
granted, they claim that librarians will refuse to provide copies
to anyone, which would be to the detriment of scholarship and
41
research.2
In seeking greater protection than that provided for in the "fair
use" provision of section 107, the libraries desire "a definite statement in the law that making a single copy to aid in teaching and
research, and particularly in interlibrary loan, is permissible and
not subject to possible suit. .... ,242 To' achieve this greater protection, the libraries propose that Congress adopt their "library
copying exemption" amendment 243 in lieu of the present provision which allows a limitatiom upon the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner for the purposes of permitting restricted
244
archival and library reproduction.
In essence, what the libraries seek by their "library copying
exemption," is the right to freely photocopy an entire article from
a periodical and supply only one copy to any individual patron.
However, if'the number of patrons, each of whom receives only
one copy, is multiplied by thousands, the libraries would be asking
for the privilege to make precisely what was described by Com240. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 90.
241. "[W]e think that the need for clarity and certainty is underscored
by the penalties that are provided in the bill which are sufficiently serious
so without clear protection a librarian might very well refuse to make a
copy of a journal for a user." Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 93. "We

still face the problem of interpretation on the part of the librarian who has

to decide whether what he is doing is so totally, clearly all right that he

is not going to be sued, or if he is sued, that he can afford to defend, and

that defense will probably help him win it." Id. at 96.
242. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 106.
243. The proposed "library copying exemption" amendment provides in
part:
(d) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section [108] apply to a copy of a work .....
made at the request
of a user of the collections of the library or archives, including a
user who makes his request through another library or archives,
but only under the following conditions:
(1) The library or archives shall be entitled, without further investigation, to supply a copy of no more than one article or
other contribution to a copyrighted collection or periodical issue,
or to supply a copy or phonorecord of a similarly small part of
any other copyrighted work.
(2) The library or archives shall be entitled to supply a
copy or phonorecord of an entire work, or of more than a relatively
small part of it, ifthe -library-or -archives - has first determined, on
the basis of a reasonable investigation that a copy or phonorecord
of the copyrighted work cannot be readily obtained from trade
sources.
Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 89.
244. S. 1361, § 108. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Reproduction by
Libraries and Archives. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 71.
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missioner Davis as "wholesale copying. ' 245 He determined that
such a privilege would be economically detrimental to publishers
and therefore not a "fair use" of the publisher's copyrighted works.
Under this amendment, the libraries also seek the right to
photocopy an entire work if they determine, after a reasonable investigation that the work is unavailable from trade sources. This
provision appears to greatly exceed the present conceptions of fair
use. Copying of an entire work has always been generally considered to be an infringement of the owner's copyright. 24 However,
this amendment, if adopted, would provide a statutory privilege to
do just that.
In addition to the excessive breadth of this amendment, many
questions immediately arise as to what constitutes a "reasonable
investigation" or what does "cannot be readily obtained" entail?
Questions such as how extensive must the investigation be in terms
of the number of searches that must be conducted, how long each
must be, who, on the library staff, must conduct the investigation,
or what documentation of the investigation must be made, are subject to argument and difficult to answer. The answers to these
questions would have to originate from a compromise between the
copyright users and the copyright owners before they would be
acceptable to both groups. However, as of this time, the publishers
have yet to agree to the present library practices being a fair use.
The possibility of their agreeing upon the answers to the above
questions would be a chimerical supposition at best. If adopted in
its present form by Congress, the "library copying exemption"
would afford the libraries so vast a latitude in their photocopying
practices that it would ultimately result in driving many of the
small subscription technical journals out of print.2

47

In effect their

amendment would not be a "fair use" but could, perhaps, be more
appropriately described as "fair abuse."
4. Effect of the Commissioner's Opinion Upon Publishers
It should be noted at the outset that the publishers are not
adverse to the idea of having their copyrighted works photocopied
by educators, libraries, or anyone else. 248 They are aware of the
245.

See note 216 and accompanying text supra.

246.

Wihtel v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Public Affairs Asso-

ciates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484,
486 (9th Cir. 1937). But see Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1353 (1973).
247. See note 217 and accompanying text supra.

248.

See note 291 and accompanying text infra.

fact that "photocopying is here to stay, and nothing that educators,
'249
It
librarians, or publishers decide is going to change that fact.
is their firmly held belief "that those who use the copyrighted information .

.

. by photocopying should contribute to the cost of

publishing and that copyright is the traditional instrument for insuring this contribution while protecting the public interest in wide
dissemination. ' 250 Their belief seems highly justifiable from the
viewpoints of common sense and economic fairness. It is common
sense reasoning that there will invariably be a decrease in the
number of subscriptions to a periodical, especially an esoteric
periodical such as a technical medical journal, if the aggregate of
researchers, librarians, and educators are each permitted to obtain
a single copy from the library of any article they desire. Because
large scale aggregate copying would lead to a reduction in subscriptions, the publishers would be forced by economic considerations
to make a corresponding increase in their rates to defray the fixed
cost of editing, organizing, and preparing the work for publication. 251 If the periodical, subject to aggregate photocopying, has
a limited or small circulation, the mere cost of publishing the work
would soon overrun not only return profits from sales but also the
return in the cost of producing the periodical.2 52 In the latter case,
it would be economically unfeasible to publish the periodical and
the publisher would soon cease to do so unless he were compensated
for his loss. Since it is in the public interest to keep quality publications in print by private industry,25 3 it seems eminently fair that
249. Hearings S. 1361,supra note 138, at 139.
250. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 152. "The researcher, student, scientist, or engineer does not really want the copy he has ....
He
is fundamentally looking for ideas. The fact that it is on a piece of paper
in a particular form could not matter less to him. He is looking for ideas
within the paper." MARKE, supra note 15, at 82. See note 201 supra.
251. 487 F.2d 1345, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (dissent); 170 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679
(1972). "Publishing cost have risen and are rising continuously, making the
continuation of the scientific-journal system increasingly difficult." Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 123.
252. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 129-30. "[W]hile the number
of subscriptions remains static, the costs of preparation continually increases. At the same time photocopying technology continues to improve
enabling copies to be made more cheaply and efficiently." Id. at 156. "We
fear that no technological advances can cut the cost of production sufficiently to make up for the fact that the photocopy at present bears no part
of the editorial and composition cost which are incurred before a single copy
can be produced." Id. at 160.
253. If the government controlled publishing there is a substantial possibility that subconscious governmental control would occur, particularly in
political and ideological publications. The control would come most likely
in the form of a failure to grant appropriation funds for works adverse to
the government's policy, or administratively from intentional or subconscious editing or poor preparation of "undesirable" publications. See Hearings H.R. 4347, supra note 15, at 1512; Project, supra note 18, at 955-57; Comment, Library Photocopying: Striking a Balance, supra note 22, at 509. "If
they [libraries] are going to copy and join in the supplementary publishing
scheme . . . they should help to pay for the initial costs of collecting jour-
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those who directly receive the benefits of the publisher's efforts
should help to pay for them, especially where their actions would
otherwise drive the publications off the market. 25 4 The publishers,
therefore, oppose both the "limited education exemption" and the
"library copying exemption" on the basis that they would permit
a greater increase in uncompensated copying than would be permitted under the present revision bill as viewed in the light of
255
Commissioner Davis' opinion.
The majority of the publishers favor adoption of the present
revision bill, S. 1361, as is, 256 without any clarifications or amendments by educators or librarians. They oppose the educator's
exemption on the basis that it would "legalize uncompensated,
education copying that goes far beyond the boundaries of fair
use.1 25 7 The publishers are not in exact agreement on their proposals relating to a solution of the library photocopying problem.
Some propose that the limited rights of libraries and archives to
photocopy, as set out in section 108 of S. 1361, should be enacted
in its present form. 258 Others maintain that section 108 should be
deleted from the present bill, and the matter of library and archival
reproduction rights should be "referred for study to the National
Committee to be established under Title II of S. 1361."259 However,
before the ruling of the Court of Claims in Williams and Wilkins,
the publishers were all in agreement that the codification of the
doctrine of "fair use" in section 107260 should be retained in S. 1361
as is. In essence they "are opposed to any legislative history which
appears to construe fair use so as to permit the photocopying of
single copies of entire articles without compensation." 261
C.

Williams and Wilkins Company v. United States-The Court of
Claims "A Holding Operation"
The Court of Claims reversed Commissioner Davis' opinion 26 2

nals and the content that they represent." Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138,
at 116.
254. The only way to save private limited circulation technical journals
from extinction is to broaden the income base. This can only be done by
spreading the cost of publication among a greater number of users, including those who use the journal through photocopying." Hearings S. 1361,
supra note 138, at 156.
255. Id. at 140, 143, 149, 160, 173.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 214.
258. Id. at 140, 143. See notes 166, 220 and accompanying text supra.
259. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 173.
260. See note 220 supra.
261. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 152.
262. 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973).

and concluded that the interlibrary loan practices of the library
of NIH and the NLM were a fair and not an unfair use of the
Williams and Wilkins Company's medical journals. However, in its
decision the Court of Claims has further compounded and confused
the already difficult determination of what is or is not a fair use
of a copyrighted work. Instead of utilizing the traditional and well
established judicial considerations 26 3 for construing the fairness of
a use, the court confuses the determination of what is a fair use
by including a veritable host of other factors 264 having no relation
to the well established factors. The court also compounds the
problem of determining "fair use" by setting forth three major propositions 265 of its own that resemble only slightly the traditional
factors to be considered.
1. Failure of Publisher to Prove Actual Economic Harm

First, the majority of the court concluded that the Williams
and Wilkins Company failed to prove that it had or would be substantially harmed by the interlibrary loan practices carried out by
the government's medical research libraries. 26 6 The court's basis
for this conclusion is that the evidence shows that: (a) the overall
subscriptions and sales therefrom, of the four journals involved, increased from 1958 to 1969; (b) the total annual income from the
entire operations of the Williams and Wilkins Company increased
from $272,000 in 1959 to $951,000 in 1968;(c) the four journals represent a relatively small percentage of the company's business; and
(d) that the company's "business appears to have been growing
the rate of growth of manfaster than the gross national product or
'2 67
power working in the field of science.
It must be noted that, "by the very nature of an action for
copyright infringement,

' 268

the publishers have experienced great

difficulty in proving their present actual damages as a result of
the interlibrary loan programs. 269 The most relevant factor to
which they can attribute the cause of their damages, is the cause
and effect relation shown by the reduction in library subscriptions
to their journals. 27 0 The Williams and Wilkins Company states that
"library subscriptions to Williams and Wilkins journals for the past
three years [1970-73] now show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the interlibrary loan procedure is damaging our market." '7 1 They
have offered statistical proof to show that although the number
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See note 203 and accompanying text supra.
See note 296 and accompanying text infra.
487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (1973).
But see Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 159, 176.
487 F.2d 1345, 1357 (1973).
Id. at 1368.
Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 124, 151, 159.
Id. at 159.
Id.
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of libraries purchasing their journals has increased, the total
number of journals subscribed to by the totality of libraries, from
1970 to 1973, has decreased. 272 Moreover, subscriptions to some of
the Williams and Wilkins Company's journals were cancelled by
some libraries.2 73 A survey, by random telephone sample, was conducted by the Williams and Wilkins Company among those libraries
cancelling subscription, to ascertain how the library would provide
the information, previously obtained from the cancelled journals,
to those patrons requesting it. "Invaribly the reply was, 'by means
of interlibrary loan.' "274 Nevertheless, this statistical proof would
not constitute proof of actual damages as required by the majority
of the Court of Claims.
Although it is difficult for publishers to prove their present
damages, it appears more than reasonable that they will be harmed
if the interlibrary loan practice, which i; irrefutably in the best
interest of the libraries, 275 continues to flourish. The increase in
technological achievements that have made photocopying faster,
easier and less expensive, would apparently lead to greater photocopying by the libraries who must generally operate under a limited
budget.27 6 Although it is asserted by a few libraries that the interlibrary photocopying program tends to lead to an increase in
subscriptions,277 the increased facility in obtaining inexpensive
copies tends to negate the incentive to subscribe to a journal, while
maintaining the libraries objectives of disseminating information
requested by its patrons. The Court of Claims, however, ignored
such future considerations of the potential effects of technology or
an upsurge in the interlibrary loan program, and required solid
evidence of actual damages.
What the majority of the court deems sufficient for proof of
harm is "solid evidence,"'27 that the libraries' photocopying has
caused economic harm. This evidence must be supported by an impartial and "hard factual study of the actual effect of photocopy272. Id. at 151.
273. Id. at 159. Evidence exist that at least "one subscriber cancelled
a subscription . . . because the subscriber believed the cost of photocopying
the journal had become less than the journal's annual subscription rate."
Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1378 (Ct. Cl.
1973); 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679 (1972).
274. Hearings 1361, supra note 138, at 159.

275. Id. at 151. But see Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1359 (1973).
276.

See Library Photocopying: Striking a Balance, supra note 22, at

509, 510; Project,supra note 18, at 941-43.
277.

Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 101.

278.

487 F.2d 1345, 1358 (Ct. Cl. 1973).

77.

MARKE, supra note 15, at

ing"2 79 upon the publishers business. Such a burden of proof seems
unwarranted, in view of the difficulty in proving actual damages
and especially in view of the fact that "it is well established ...
that proof of actual damage is not required, and the defense of fair
use may be overcome where potential injury is shown.12 0 Such
a potential injury was determined by Commissioner Davis and is
further substantiated by the decrease in the total number of
journals subscribed to by libraries that was experienced by the
28
Williams and Wilkins Company. '
The majority of the court acknowledged the fact that there was
a decrease in the subscriptions of the Company's journals in certain
years and also the fact that profits were in all years low. 2

2

Never-

theless, the court accepted the government's explanation that the
losses on subscriptions and profits were the results of particular
circumstances other than photocopying. 28 3 Regardless of the losses
incurred by the Williams and Wilkins Company and their small
profits, the majority refused to discern any potential detrimental
effect of library photocopying upon the Company's market for
24
medical trade journals.
From the evidence that the majority of the court puts forth
to show there is no substantial injury, the extent of the injury to
the publisher's business required to show economic harm must be
28 5
such as to seriously affect the total business of the publisher,
irrespective of the fact that the journals infringed may constitute
only a relatively small part of that total business. The court seems
also to require that the total taxable income of the publisher be
seriously affected or that the business growth rate be stalled or
reversed, as a result of the libraries practices. 26 From an economic
point of view, it would be unsound and extremely poor management
to let a small portion of the total business, such as the publication
of technical journals, cause the economic consequences that the
court requires to show economic harm. 28 7

If such were to occur,

279. Id. at 1359.
280. Id. at 1358.
281. Id. at 1368. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. Inc. v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1938); NimMER, supra note 3,
at § 145.
282. 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
283. Id. at 1357 n.20.
284. See MARKE, supra note 13, at 85. Contra, Williams and Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1370 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Williams v.
Wilkins, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679 (1972).
285. See notes 281-284 and accompanying text supra.
286. 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973).

287.

[A]s publishers and businessmen, we would be remiss if we

did not consider all the factors that influence the economic viability
of our journals. For when this economic viability is threatened,
so too is the very existence of the journals and their role in the
spreading of vital medical and scientific information.
Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 168 (letter from Chairman of the Board
of Williams and Wilkins Company to customers and friends).
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the publisher would, in the interest of the total business, allow the
unprofitable journals to fail 288 unless he received compensation to
offset the losses he would incur from library photocopying.
2. Detrimental Effect to Medical Science if Library Photocopying is Stopped
The second proposition upon which the majority of the court
bases it's decision is the belief "that medical science would be
seriously hurt if such library photocopying were stopped. 28s9 The
court assumes 290 that a finding of copyright infringement by them
would result in the entire cessation of library photocopying of
medical journals for its patrons. This assumption does not take
into account the practical considerations that photocopying has for
publishers and, moreover, this assumption is not supported by the
facts of this case. First, from a practical standpoint, the publishers
are aware of the advantages of photocopying and its permanence
upon modern library and educational practices. Indeed, the publishers do not seek to stop library photocopying, they only wish to
be compensated for the loss that such photocopying causes. It has
been stated by publishers that:
[I]t is unrealistic and not in the public interest to consider
restricting in any way the use of photocopying devices.
They serve a useful purpose in the dissemination of knowledge. Since we, as publishers, are in that business, we certainly
don't want to see the spread of knowledge curtail29
ed. ,
The majority of the court's concern that library photocopying
would be stopped if they found that it constituted copyright infringement is without factual basis for the United States Court
2 92
of Claims does not have the power to enjoin government agencies,
such as the libraries involved in this case. All that the Court of
Claims can do, if it finds infringement of a copyright by a govern293
ment agency, is award reasonable and entire compensation.
Simply stated, this means that the Court of Claims could not order
the government libraries to stop photocopying medical journals if
it found their prior practices to be an infringement. It could only
288.

"[I]n recent years there have been journals that have failed and

in the opinion of those at Williams and Wilkins, photocopying has played
a role in these failures." Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (dissent).
289. Id. at 1356 (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 1386 (dissent).
291. Hearings S. 597, supra note 138, at 976.
292. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1962).

make them pay reasonable damages for the violation of the proprietor's copyright.
It may be asserted that the fear of damage suits would cause
the libraries to stop photocopying medical journals entirely. This
assertion is callous and unmeritorious for it places the libraries in
the position of saying: "Since the law holds illegal our prior practice of freely photocopying medical journals without permission, we
will stop photocopying altogether and thereby seriously hurt
medical science rather than avoid damage suits by seeking permission to photocopy from the copyright proprietor who doesn't want
us to stop photocopying but has the effrontery to want us to pay
for it." In addition, an assertion that the cost to the libraries for
permission to photocopy would cause them to stop photocopying
cannot be sustained because the libraries could erase their expense
by passing this cost on to the patrons requesting the photocopies.
Perhaps, as the dissent points out, 29 4 the majority was concerned that its decision would set a precedent for injunctive relief
in suits against non-government libraries which is expressly authorized under present copyright law. However, "the present law
leaves it to the discretion of the court whether an injunction will
be granted or denied. ' 295 Thus the fear of the majority of the court
that a finding of infringement would result in the cessation of
library photocopying of medical journals appears unwarranted for
the reasons that: (1) the court is powerless to grant the injunction
against the government libraries, (1) no one desires to stop library
photocopying, and (3) other courts would not be bound by stare
decisis to grant an injunction.
3. Final SoLution is for Congress
The decision of the court adds further confusion to the meaning
of doctrine of fair use in that it does not say which of the multiplicity of factors or combinations thereof it considers are essential
or predominant. Nor does the majority say if any one or more
would be sufficient for the court to find a particular practice a "fair
use." Before it held that the government library photocopying was
a fair use, the court required the coexistence in combination of all
of the following factors: (1) no prior dispositive decisions; (2) lack
of commercial gain by the library and its patrons; (3) declaration
and enforcement of reasonably strict limitations on photocopying;
(4) length of time photocopying has been performed; (5) general
acceptance of the practice; (6) serious effects upon users if practice
is stopped; (7) lack of hard factual proof of actual damages; (8)
inaction by Congress; (9) lack of a satisfactory compensation
294.
295.

487 F.2d 1345, 1386 (Ct. C1. 1973).
Id. at 1386-87.
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program; (10) and the present efforts of Congress to pass legislation
20 6
on copyright law revision.
The sheer number of factors that this court requires to exist,
all in combination, is, of itself, sufficient to make the import of
this decision extremely narrow. Notwithstanding this fact, the
court further restricts the precedential value of its decision by
stating:
[O]ur decision is restricted to the type and context of use
by NIH and NLM, as shown by this record. . . . We do
not pass on dissimilar systems or uses of copyrighted
materials by other institutions or enterprises, or in other
fields, or as applied to items other than journals, articles,
or with significant variations. We have nothing to say, in
particular, about the possibilities of computer print-outs or
other297
such products of the newer technology now being
born.
As a result of this restrictive language, the decision does not and
appears not to be intended to give guidance to other courts or to
the legislature as to what is a fair use or what are the relevant
factors to be considered that would be applicable to other cases.
The court shifts the entire burden of setting guidelines for library
photocopying onto the legislature. It is the "hope" of the majority
that "the result in the present case will be but a holding operation
in the interim period before Congress enacts its preferred solution." 298 What the majortiy hopes will be a "holding operation"
may result in a Pyrrhic victory for the libraries, for "it must be
continuously remembered that there will be nothing to copy unless
the journals remain alive, and that uncompensated photocopying
will in the end kill them. ' 29 9 If the existing eighteen year delay
in the ability of Congress to pass a revision bill is any indication
of the future amount of time required to pass a revision bill, the
ruling of the majority of the Court of Claims in Williams and
Wilkins may indeed be "the Dred Scott decision of copyright
300
law.
The decision of the Court of Claims, in a "ground breaking"
case, leaves much to be desired, especially at a time when Congress
is attempting to resolve the controversial library photocopying
problem and is itself seeking clarification of the present meaning
296. Id. at 1362.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1363.
299. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 152 (Statement of Director of
Marketing for Williams and Wilkins Co.).
300. 487 F.2d 1345, 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (dissent).

and interpretation of the judicially created doctrine of fair use.3 °1
The multitude of factors required by the court to determine the
fairness of a use, results in the fact that the decision supports
neither the position of the educators, or libraries in general. The
decision of the court has the effect of casting the publishers and
their reliance upon the "flexibility of the courts" into a stormy sea
of conflicting judicial interpretations. It seems doubtful that the
"holding operation" of the court will induce the library, educational
or publishing factions to, once again, forsake their "entrenched
positions" and come to a compromise.3 0 2 Instead, it may cause
them to reinforce their uncompromising positions.
In view of the "flexibility" accorded the Williams and Wilkins
case by the Court of Claims, the reconciliation of the interest of
the copyright proprietor on the one hand, and the legitimate public
interest in the rapid dissemination of knowledge on the other, is,
perhaps, more than ever before an appropriate matter for the legislature to resolve. Thus far, however, Congress has not acted upon
the problem because it is still investigating the factors involved in
reaching an appropriate compromise.303 Most notable of the factors
considered by Congress is the actual impact that technological innovations in copying devices have and will have upon the publishing industries, and the formulation of a practical plan for compensating the publishers that is acceptable to all parties concerned.
The position in which Congress finds itself is summed up by Senator
McClellan who states:
We have to try to find some middle ground so the publishers and authors will be protected, that is to say, will
be better able to get a return adequate to carry on the work
before us and
4 also so that the material gets further disseminated. 0
D. Williams and Wilkins Company Plan-A Practical and Workable Solution?
Of the many proposed plans for collecting royalties for library
301. On commenting upon the determination of what is a fair use for
library photocopying purposes, Senator McClellan remarked that "the whole
subject is very complex, and it is most difficult to provide even by rules,
regulation, or even by statute, clarification about which there could not be
different interpretations ....
But we have to go as far as we can toward
making it certain, as far as what we can and we cannot do." Hearings S.
1361, supra note 138, at 96-97. "We are trying to legislate on every particular kind of journal and every particular kind of publication and information
that may be copyrighted ....
We need some help, do you not see?" Id.
at 117 (remarks of Senator McClellan to Executive Director of American
Chemical Society).
302. See note 148 supra.
303. "I would be glad if you folks could get some understanding and
agreement ... and not come in here and ask us to pass a law to regulate
this." (Compensation agreement between publisher and libraries) (Statement of Senator McClellan). Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 154.
304. Id. at 148.
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photocopying, 30 5 the one that appears most practical is the "blanket
license/institutional rate" plan developed by the Williams and
Wilkins Company.30 6 Originally proposed as a copyright royalty
license,80 7 the plan was divided into two parts, an institutional rate
portion and a per page rate portion. Under the institutional or flat
rate, "one time payment" portion, the library would purchase the
journal at an institutional rate as opposed to an individual subscriber rate. The difference between these two rates would constitute the licensee fee which, as determined by the Williams and
Wilkins Company, was based on the number of text pages published,
and a susceptability to photocopying factor,3 08 all multiplied by
a ratio no higher than 50 per page. The average institutional rate
fee computed for Williams and Wilkins, 1972 journals, amounted to
$3.65. s09 However, this "one time payment" licensee rate was
applicable only to libraries not participating in the interlibrary loan
program, and permitted only a single photocopy to be made per
person while physically in the library.
Considering, the institutional rate license fee too minimal to
cover losses attributable to the interlibrary loan program, and the
fact that each participant in the program already kept records of
all interlibrary loan transactions,8 10 the company considered it
reasonable "that these 'lending or sending' libraries could more
equitably be licensed on a pay as you go basis." 3 11 The amount
of the fee on the "pay as you go" basis was set at 50 per page
305. "Most of these plans provide for some licensing of library photocopying in return for a fee raid to the copyright owner." Comment, Library
Photocopying: Striking a Balance, supra note 22, at 510. Included in such
plans are proposals for a private agency to collect copyright royalty fees
which would operate similar to American Society of Comoosers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP) or Broadcast Music Industries (BMI). Other proposals contemplate legislatively created collection systems on a per use or
a flat fee basis. For a thorough discussion of the merits of proposed plans,
see Breyer, Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 176; Symposium, Can
Copyright Law Respond to the New Technology, 61 L. LrB. J. 387 (1968);
Project, supra note 18, at 464-75; Note, Education and Copyright Law:
Analysis of the Amended Copyright Revision Bill and Proposals for Statutory Licensing and a ClearinghouseSystem, 56 VA. L. REv. 644 (1970).
306. HearingsS. 1361, supra note 138, at 157-71.
307. Id. at 158.
308. This factor measures the susceptibility of the journal to photocopying as determined by the Williams and Wilkins experience with reprints
of the particular journal. Id. at 158.
309. The $3.65 represented an average copying fee based on the Williams and Wilkins Company's total manufacturing costs, the number of
pages published in the journal, the subscription price, and the susceptibility
of the journal to photocopying. Id. at 153.
310. See note 207 supra.
311. Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 158.

photocopied. The Williams and Wilkins Company considered Commissioner Davis' opinion as having the effect of law and therefore
the future institution of their licensing
felt justified in announcing
3 12
scheme to the libraries.
The libraries, upon the advice of counsel, opposed the licensing
plan on the basis that they did not consider the Commissioner's
decision as binding or having the effect of law until the case had
been finally adjudicated.3 13 For the same reason, they rejected any
implication that it was necessary for them to pay a copyright
royalty. However, the NIH and NLM were willing to "accede to
a rise in price based on an institutional rate which would be applicable 'to all libraries, great and small.' "314 In view of the "deluge
of letters from libraries threatening a boycott of W. & W. journals
on the basis that a license for photocopy was not necessary...,,315

the company withdrew its licensing plans. However, accepting the
libraries position, the company set forth new institutional subscription rates, at an increased cost, to all libraries and accompanied
them with an express rejection that the new institutional rates had
any connection with a copyright royalty or license, implied or
otherwise. In effect the company received its average license fee
of $3.65, while the libraries received no license to photocopy. 31 6
The ruling of the court of claims will apparently not aid the NIH
or NLM in reducing their new institutional rates because the rates
are expressly stated as having no relationship to a licensee to
photocopy.
Having, circuitously obtained compensation for non-interlibrary loan photocopying, the Williams and Wilkins Company has
proposed an institutional rate plan to cover interlibrary loan
operations. Their plan is that the regional medical libraries pay
twice the established institutional rate, and the medical school
31 7
libraries pay one and one-half the established institutional rate.
The advantage of the institutional or flat rate licensing plan
for the libraries, is that it eliminates the need for keeping cumber312. Id. at 160-61.
313. Id. at 165.
314. Id.
315. Most of these letters were from NIH and NLM and its subsidiary
libraries. They were a response to the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare's (HEW) directive that no royalties were to be paid to publishers from their HEW grant funds.
316. Senator McClellan: "So you got your $3.65 after all?" Mr.
Albrecht (Dir. Marketing, Williams and Wilkins Co.). "Yes, but we didn't
give the libraries what we wanted to give them." Senator McClellan:
"They would not have any objection now to your giving it to them? I
mean, you got their money. Why don't you just say 'thank you,' and go
ahead with your plans?" Mr. Grenbaum (Counsel, Williams and Wilkins
Co.): "The reason you can't do that, Mr. Chairman, would be that it would
eliminate any kind of control you would eventually have. The technology
is going to change." Hearings S. 1361, supra note 138, at 155.
317. Id. at 171.
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some and complicated records of each requested copy, or the need
for an accounting and payment to the publishers. The library does
nothing except pay the license fee and may thereafter copy as much
as it desires. Likewise no accounting or separate collection procedures are required by the publisher.31 8 Although the basic
principles of the plan are sound, the libraries should proceed with
caution in adopting it, lest the same situation occur as has occurred
with the C.A.T.V. royalty payment issue.3 10 The details of the plan
will have to be set out so that the institutional rate will be made
to reflect the actual injury to the publishers' markets that photocopying causes. The details should be subject to adjustment as new
information is made available.
It is submitted that the additional factor which should be added
to the institutional rate plan, is that the details and adjustment
factors be turned over to the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works for its study, evaluation and
recommendations. This will not solve the problem of the publisher's present losses due to photocopying; however, if he deems it
necessary, the National Commission could provide information for
pro rata payments to recoup losses for publishers still in existence.
However, in light of the court of claims ruling, publishers will face
a difficult time in recovering compensation for photocopying from
libraries, unless Congress intervenes. The flat rate license plan
seems most appropriate for library photocopying of journals and
books, but its suitability in the educational fields is dependent upon
other factors, such as what classroom use is a fair use, or the frequency of use of the copyrighted work by a teacher or teachers,
the number of copies made, and so forth. Finding the solution to
the problem of compensation for educational use beyond that considered a fair use is more difficult than finding a solution for compensation for library photocopying. It should also be turned over to
the National Commission.
CONCLUSION
3 20
the United States Supreme Court
In Goldstein v. California,

318. Id.
319. The copyright proprieters made a consensus agreement with broadcasters to agree to a satisfactory compromise on CATV royalty schedules.
If no agreements were reached prior to enactment of S. 1361, the parties
involved would be subject to compulsory licensing. The CATV group received all they were after by the consensus agreement, but the copyright
proprieters did not achieve the adequate CATV royalty schedule they
sought and the CATV group refuses to arbitrate further, leaving the parties
in an impass.
320. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).

held that a state could, via statute or the common law, protect
literary property in perpetuity provided that the literary property
protected did not fall within the enumerated categories of subject
matter that are copyrightable.3 21 This decision has sustained and
clarified the concurrent operation of federal and state government
in the protection of literary property. However, our dual system
of "copyright" laws with its dividing line of "publication" 322 has
become anachronistic because of technological advancements which
3 23
have rendered it obsolete.
In order to update American copyright law, Congress has been
attempting to pass legislation to preempt all state protection that
is equivalent to copyright.3 24 However, the interests of educators,
libraries and publishers, among others, have been a major factor
in the delay of such legislation. 325 Each group has a legitimate
and valid interest to be protected in the realm of photocopying and
fair use. Both seek to further the "progress of science and the
useful arts" by providing for an adequate dissemination of knowledge to the public.
Since both interests are equally valid, some compromise must
be reached by both sides. The educators and librarians must come
to realize that an uncontrolled "fair use" would have a detrimental
effect upon publishers. At the present the best program 26 appears
to be that of the Williams and Wilkins Company, which places no
large administrative burden upon photocopiers. Nor does it place a
burden upon publishers to police the fair use practices of photocopiers. Although conceptually sound, the details of the Williams and
Wilkins plan would require study by an impartial group to ensure
fairness for both sides in their formulation. To that effect the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works should be established as soon as possible so that "hard factual
studies" can be conducted to give "solid evidence" upon which the
details of the Williams and Wilkins plan can be set out. During
the interim between legislative enactment of omnibus copyright revision law, the Commission could be providing the needed factual
evidence to support future provisions that would be more equitable
to all concerned.*
BRUCE HART
321. Id. at 560.
322. See notes 173-175 and accompanying text supra.
323. See notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra.
324. See notes 159-180 and accompanying text supra.
325. See notes 224-261 and accompanying text supra.
326. See notes 306-320 and accomranying text supra.
* Subsequent to the writing of this article, Pub. L. 93-573 was
signed by President Ford on December 31, 1974. It established in the
Library of Congress a National Commission on New Technological Uses
and also made the "Record Piracy" Act of 1971 a permanent part of the
copyright law.

